Russia Adapting New Fires Tactics To Overcome Artillery Challenges

Russian military doctrine has historically placed artillery at the center of its combat operations, using massed firepower to degrade enemy forces while infantry and armor support and exploit those effects. In the Russia-Ukraine War, this central role of artillery is clearly evident, with Russia expending over 10,000 artillery rounds per day. However, four years of sustained fighting, combined with Ukraine’s battlefield innovations, are challenging Russia’s ability to employ artillery effectively. As a result, the Russian military appears to be exploring alternative means to deliver fires, increasing reliance on aerial drones, ground robotic systems, and new tactics.

The Challenges Faced By Russian Artillery

Russian forces have suffered significant artillery losses over the course of the war, driven largely by Ukraine’s increasingly effective drone capabilities. Open-source reporting has visually confirmed more than 1,700 Russian artillery systems destroyed or disabled, though the true number is likely much higher, with Ukrainian estimates exceeding 34,000. These losses have forced Russia to draw heavily from aging Soviet-era stockpiles and import foreign systems to offset the shortfall.

In addition to combat losses, four years of sustained fighting have taken a toll on Russia’s artillery systems. Gun barrels, which have a finite lifespan, degrade with prolonged use and lose effectiveness. This problem is compounded by reliance on the older, Cold War-era systems pulled from storage and pushed beyond their intended limits. Russia has increased production and repair efforts, but rapid barrel wear remains a persistent challenge in high-intensity operations.

Despite these challenges, Russia continues to field a large number of modern and legacy artillery systems across the front. Meanwhile, Ukraine has started to exploit these systems’ largest vulnerability by targeting their ammunition resupply vehicles. Each Russian howitzer requires a large and constant flow of ammunition, and these resupply vehicles are relatively easy targets for Ukrainian drones. Without steady resupply, Russian artillery systems cannot operate.

The Shift From Artillery To Drone-Based Fires

When Ukraine began to face an artillery shell shortage, it increasingly turned to drones, particularly FPV strike drones, which it has employed at scale. Given Ukraine’s success, it is easy to overlook that Russia was an early pioneer in this domain and the first military to integrate drones into tactical formations. However, while systems such as the Lancet have been used for strike missions, most Russian drone activity has focused on targeting support for artillery. As artillery becomes more constrained, Russia is likely to shift more heavily toward strike and bomber drones.

To support this transition, Russia has already begun expanding its drone production capacity, particularly for low-cost FPV systems that can be fielded in large numbers to offset artillery shortfalls. This effort requires not only mass production but also the ability to rapidly adapt designs and countermeasures to keep pace with Ukraine’s evolving counter-drone capabilities. It further requires training and sustaining large numbers of drone operators to employ these systems effectively at scale. In effect, Russia is working to replicate the flexibility and scale of Ukraine’s decentralized drone ecosystem. Meanwhile, it is increasing production of more established systems such as the Lancet to complement large-scale FPV use.

Replicating Ukraine’s approach also requires the development of heavier bomber drones, often referred to as “Baba Yaga” systems. These platforms have played a significant role in Ukrainian operations, particularly for delivering larger munitions such as anti-tank mines. Until recently, Russia appeared to lack a comparable capability, but recent Telegram posts from the Russian Ministry of Defense indicate that bomber drones are now being used in tactical operations.

This shift toward drone-based fires offers several advantages over traditional artillery. Drone strikes are more precise, allowing similar effects with fewer munitions, an important factor in a prolonged war of attrition. Furthermore, they enable faster targeting cycles, with reconnaissance drones identifying targets, relay drones maintaining communications, and strike or bomber drones executing attacks in near real time. This compressed sensor-to-shooter loop improves responsiveness and adaptability on a rapidly changing battlefield.

The Use Of Ground Robots To Support Fire Missions

Parallel to its aerial drone efforts, Russia is developing ground-based robotic systems. Both Russia and Ukraine have been developing and fielding ground robots for logistics, mining, and casualty evacuation. More recently, Russia has been developing ground robots capable of serving as improvised strike systems carrying explosive payloads. These platforms offer an alternative to aerial drones, particularly in environments where electronic warfare or air defenses limit drone effectiveness. Their lower profile and ability to use terrain for concealment can make them harder to detect.

Russia is also experimenting with ground robots as mobile indirect fire platforms, including systems equipped with mortars such as the 82 mm Bagulnik. These ground robots can move to forward positions, potentially avoiding detection, and conduct fire missions remotely or semi-autonomously. Some designs include automated loading, allowing sustained fires without a crew present. Once ammunition is expended, the platform can withdraw to rearm and redeploy, reducing risk to personnel while preserving indirect fire capability. Collectively, these systems expand Russia’s options for delivering fires against Ukrainian targets beyond traditional artillery.

Tactical Adaptations To Overcome Artillery Challenges

As they field these new systems, Russia is adapting at the tactical level, further reducing its reliance on traditional artillery fire. In particular, it is shifting away from large, massed formations in favor of smaller, dispersed units. These elements operate with a lower signature, reducing their exposure to Ukrainian drones. They can infiltrate contested areas, identify weak points, and conduct localized attacks without extensive preparatory fires. Rather than relying on artillery to shape the battlefield, these units generate effects through drones, organic fires, and close-range engagements, creating opportunities for follow-on forces.

Russia is also leveraging other systems within its current inventory to shape the battlefield in roles traditionally filled by artillery. This includes increased use of tactical aviation, particularly glide bombs and stand-off munitions. While effective, this approach carries greater risk from Ukrainian air defenses and depends on the availability of aircraft and munitions. At the same time, Russia is expanding its use of landmines and electronic warfare to achieve disruption effects historically associated with artillery.

Ultimately, the challenges Russia faces with artillery highlight the need for rapid adaptation under pressure on the modern battlefield. During World War II, the Soviet Union was forced to rebuild after massive early losses, rapidly changing tactics, reorganizing forces, and scaling industrial production. A similar, though more limited, process is underway today as Russia adjusts to new technological and operational realities shaping its use of artillery. Its ability to integrate drones, robotics, and evolving tactics into a coherent approach to fires will play a key role in shaping the future of the conflict.