This was a meeting held on the 28th, and its importance far exceeded the headline itself. The fact that a complete "national-level regulatory team" including the Ministry of Public Security, the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Central Financial Stability and Development Office, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the State Financial Regulatory Commission is all in place indicates that regulators believe the issue of virtual currencies has reached a stage where a unified approach and unified action are necessary once again. But what's truly worth discussing is a key statement that appeared at the meeting: "Stablecoins are a form of virtual currency." This is the first time that the Chinese government has explicitly defined stablecoins in an official document and directly included them in the regulatory framework of "illegal financial activities involving virtual currencies." Starting today, all the ambiguity, speculation, and wishful thinking surrounding stablecoins over the past few years will disappear completely. In the past, the industry has always believed that although China's regulatory attitude towards virtual currencies is clear, there has always been a "gap in the wording" regarding whether stablecoins belong to it. Many entrepreneurs interpret this gap as "potential room for discussion," and therefore repeatedly explore directions such as "cross-border payments," "supply chain finance settlement," "foreign trade payment on behalf," "on-chain RMB," and "blockchain pilot projects." But today's statement is tantamount to regulators stepping into the limelight and drawing a solid line between the previously blurred boundaries. Since stablecoins are now included in the category of virtual currencies, they automatically fall under all previous regulatory policies regarding virtual currencies; there are no exceptions, and no pilot programs. The most common misconception in the industry is to speculate on regulatory logic from a technical perspective. Some believed that as long as the technology was advanced, security was improved, and the underlying assets were transparent, policy leeway could be obtained. However, the regulator's logic this time was very straightforward: the real risks of stablecoins far outweigh their technological value. The meeting press release repeatedly emphasized three things: money laundering, fraud, and cross-border capital flows. These three constitute the complete chain of all virtual currency-related cases over the past three years. Whether it's money laundering, online gambling, fraudulent funding chains, underground banks, or illegal currency exchange, stablecoins have become the core settlement layer. They solve the most crucial elements for gray-market businesses—speed, cross-border transactions, and difficulty in tracing—naturally becoming the starting point of risk in the eyes of regulators. As long as this risk chain remains unresolved, discussing the commercial value of stablecoins is meaningless. Regulatory priorities have always been "risk first, innovation second," and stablecoins, under current conditions, cannot meet KYC, AML, and capital account regulations, which means they will not have a policy window of opportunity. Many in the industry understand the regulatory logic of mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States within the same framework, believing that what is being done overseas will eventually be discussed in China as well. However, this meeting has provided the only correct way to judge: China will not discuss stablecoins using the "same path." China's regulatory goal has never been "to make the market more efficient," but rather "to make risks more controllable." Once this point is clearly defined, all so-called "niche innovations," "small-scale pilot programs," "regulatory sandboxes," and "on-chain RMB" lose their realistic basis. The regulatory attitude is not "strict," but rather "directly terminating the possibility." Many startups have been asking the same questions for the past few years: Can we focus solely on on-chain technology? Can we develop the system without reaching users? Can an overseas entity handle issuance while a domestic team handles the technology? Can we explore cross-border financial pilot programs in free trade zones? From today onward, these questions no longer need explanation. Because as soon as stablecoins are defined as virtual currencies, they fall directly into the framework of "virtual currency-related activities being illegal financial activities." As long as any link in your business chain connects to mainland China—users, funds, servers, promotion, settlement, technical services, matching, or agency issuance—the risk level is the same. There is no such thing as "technology companies are fine" or "serving only B-end customers is legal." The legal nature of stablecoins no longer allows for such distinctions. Today's signal is very clear: regulators have moved from "maintaining ambiguity" to "taking a clear stance." Ambiguity was once a management tool to some extent, but stablecoins are no longer suitable for such ambiguity; they have become a "key element" in many cross-border crime chains. As long as the social risks of this matter far outweigh its economic value, regulators will not provide any room for experimentation. For Chinese entrepreneurs, there is only one path if they want to create stablecoins: the project must be a completely overseas project. The most crucial point is that the project must involve overseas legal entities, overseas bank accounts, overseas audits, overseas users, and overseas regulatory licenses. It cannot provide any form of service to Chinese users, nor can it involve Chinese funds in its business operations. If any link in the chain returns to China, the project automatically falls under the category of "illegal financial activity." This is a very clear red line. You will see that Hong Kong, Singapore, the Middle East, and Europe are constantly introducing stablecoin regulatory frameworks, and these regions have completely different regulatory objectives: they hope to use stablecoins to enhance the international competitiveness of their local financial systems; while mainland China's objective is to ensure capital account management capabilities and financial security. Different goals lead to different paths. For mainland entrepreneurs, this statement is not a "complete ban," but rather a clear message: stop wasting time on directions that are impossible to implement, and instead focus your energy on overseas markets. This means the end of the stablecoin fantasy in mainland China, and that the industry no longer needs to repeatedly test the waters with "gray areas." For entrepreneurs, this is bad news because the direction has been shut down; but it's also good news because judgment has become clearer, and there's no need to waste time on the wrong path. The regulators have made their point clear; now it's up to the industry to make the judgments.This was a meeting held on the 28th, and its importance far exceeded the headline itself. The fact that a complete "national-level regulatory team" including the Ministry of Public Security, the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Central Financial Stability and Development Office, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the State Financial Regulatory Commission is all in place indicates that regulators believe the issue of virtual currencies has reached a stage where a unified approach and unified action are necessary once again. But what's truly worth discussing is a key statement that appeared at the meeting: "Stablecoins are a form of virtual currency." This is the first time that the Chinese government has explicitly defined stablecoins in an official document and directly included them in the regulatory framework of "illegal financial activities involving virtual currencies." Starting today, all the ambiguity, speculation, and wishful thinking surrounding stablecoins over the past few years will disappear completely. In the past, the industry has always believed that although China's regulatory attitude towards virtual currencies is clear, there has always been a "gap in the wording" regarding whether stablecoins belong to it. Many entrepreneurs interpret this gap as "potential room for discussion," and therefore repeatedly explore directions such as "cross-border payments," "supply chain finance settlement," "foreign trade payment on behalf," "on-chain RMB," and "blockchain pilot projects." But today's statement is tantamount to regulators stepping into the limelight and drawing a solid line between the previously blurred boundaries. Since stablecoins are now included in the category of virtual currencies, they automatically fall under all previous regulatory policies regarding virtual currencies; there are no exceptions, and no pilot programs. The most common misconception in the industry is to speculate on regulatory logic from a technical perspective. Some believed that as long as the technology was advanced, security was improved, and the underlying assets were transparent, policy leeway could be obtained. However, the regulator's logic this time was very straightforward: the real risks of stablecoins far outweigh their technological value. The meeting press release repeatedly emphasized three things: money laundering, fraud, and cross-border capital flows. These three constitute the complete chain of all virtual currency-related cases over the past three years. Whether it's money laundering, online gambling, fraudulent funding chains, underground banks, or illegal currency exchange, stablecoins have become the core settlement layer. They solve the most crucial elements for gray-market businesses—speed, cross-border transactions, and difficulty in tracing—naturally becoming the starting point of risk in the eyes of regulators. As long as this risk chain remains unresolved, discussing the commercial value of stablecoins is meaningless. Regulatory priorities have always been "risk first, innovation second," and stablecoins, under current conditions, cannot meet KYC, AML, and capital account regulations, which means they will not have a policy window of opportunity. Many in the industry understand the regulatory logic of mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States within the same framework, believing that what is being done overseas will eventually be discussed in China as well. However, this meeting has provided the only correct way to judge: China will not discuss stablecoins using the "same path." China's regulatory goal has never been "to make the market more efficient," but rather "to make risks more controllable." Once this point is clearly defined, all so-called "niche innovations," "small-scale pilot programs," "regulatory sandboxes," and "on-chain RMB" lose their realistic basis. The regulatory attitude is not "strict," but rather "directly terminating the possibility." Many startups have been asking the same questions for the past few years: Can we focus solely on on-chain technology? Can we develop the system without reaching users? Can an overseas entity handle issuance while a domestic team handles the technology? Can we explore cross-border financial pilot programs in free trade zones? From today onward, these questions no longer need explanation. Because as soon as stablecoins are defined as virtual currencies, they fall directly into the framework of "virtual currency-related activities being illegal financial activities." As long as any link in your business chain connects to mainland China—users, funds, servers, promotion, settlement, technical services, matching, or agency issuance—the risk level is the same. There is no such thing as "technology companies are fine" or "serving only B-end customers is legal." The legal nature of stablecoins no longer allows for such distinctions. Today's signal is very clear: regulators have moved from "maintaining ambiguity" to "taking a clear stance." Ambiguity was once a management tool to some extent, but stablecoins are no longer suitable for such ambiguity; they have become a "key element" in many cross-border crime chains. As long as the social risks of this matter far outweigh its economic value, regulators will not provide any room for experimentation. For Chinese entrepreneurs, there is only one path if they want to create stablecoins: the project must be a completely overseas project. The most crucial point is that the project must involve overseas legal entities, overseas bank accounts, overseas audits, overseas users, and overseas regulatory licenses. It cannot provide any form of service to Chinese users, nor can it involve Chinese funds in its business operations. If any link in the chain returns to China, the project automatically falls under the category of "illegal financial activity." This is a very clear red line. You will see that Hong Kong, Singapore, the Middle East, and Europe are constantly introducing stablecoin regulatory frameworks, and these regions have completely different regulatory objectives: they hope to use stablecoins to enhance the international competitiveness of their local financial systems; while mainland China's objective is to ensure capital account management capabilities and financial security. Different goals lead to different paths. For mainland entrepreneurs, this statement is not a "complete ban," but rather a clear message: stop wasting time on directions that are impossible to implement, and instead focus your energy on overseas markets. This means the end of the stablecoin fantasy in mainland China, and that the industry no longer needs to repeatedly test the waters with "gray areas." For entrepreneurs, this is bad news because the direction has been shut down; but it's also good news because judgment has become clearer, and there's no need to waste time on the wrong path. The regulators have made their point clear; now it's up to the industry to make the judgments.