Inside The Supply Chain That Keeps Russia’s Iskander Missiles Flying

On the morning of November 11, 2024, a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile tore through a five-story apartment block in Kryvyi Rih, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s hometown. The blast killed a 32-year-old mother, Olena Kulyk, and her three children. Rescuers found the youngest, two-month-old Ulyana, more than a day later beneath the rubble. Her husband, Maksym, survived only because he had stepped into the kitchen moments before the strike, according to reporting from CNN.

The Iskander-M is Russia’s most frequently used short-range ballistic missile, a solid-fuel weapon designed to hit cities with almost no warning. Its propellant burns hot and fast, driving the missile into a steep-arc trajectory before a violent terminal dive. At the center of that propellant is ammonium perchlorate, a chemical Russia cannot produce at scale without importing a critical precursor: high-purity sodium chlorate.

A recent analysis by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) shows why that matters. Researchers Sam Cranny-Evans and Sidharth Kaushal documented a clear downward trend in Ukraine’s interception rates since 2024, even in Patriot-defended areas. When these missiles penetrate defenses, they frequently hit populated areas, resulting in civilian deaths.

A Chemical Russia Cannot Make Alone

According to a report by the Economic Security Council of Ukraine, ammonium perchlorate can make up more than half of the Iskander’s solid propellant. Producing it at scale requires high-purity sodium chlorate, something Russia struggled with after losing much of its domestic capacity following the Soviet collapse. Moscow depends on imports to keep its missile lines running.

That gap has been filled by Farg’onaazot, a major chemical plant in Uzbekistan owned by Singapore-based Indorama Corporation. The company is controlled by the India-born Lohia family. Indorama’s chairman, Sri Prakash Lohia, an Indonesian citizen with U.K. permanent residency, is the brother-in-law of Lakshmi Mittal, the executive chairman of ArcelorMittal.

The report notes that this places a company linked to the Mittal family inside the supply chain for a key input used in missiles that have repeatedly struck the Mittal-owned steel plant in Kryvyi Rih and killed its employees.

The Supply Chain

Farg’onaazot shipped $11.4 million worth of sodium chlorate to Russia in 2024 and another $6.9 million in the first half of 2025, with the latest shipment recorded in June 2025. Indorama acquired the plant for $140 million in early 2024.

In 2024, China supplied 61% of Russia’s sodium chlorate imports while Uzbekistan provided 39%. Together, these two countries shipped more than $36.9 million worth of the chemical to Russia during 2024 and early 2025.

Russia depends on this imported chemical because it cannot produce high quality sodium chlorate domestically. The country is attempting to build new production facilities, but most will not come online until 2025 to 2027, leaving a critical vulnerability in Russia’s missile production capacity.

The Sanctions Gap

Despite sodium chlorate being listed under EU sanctions as a substance supporting Russia’s industrial capabilities, the largest suppliers from Uzbekistan and China, including Farg’onaazot, remain unsanctioned.

Olena Yurchenko, director for analysis, research and investigation at the Economic Security Council of Ukraine, told me the problem extends beyond simply expanding existing EU sanctions. “The critical vulnerabilities lie not in the formal ban on EU exports, which already exists for several precursors, but in three structural loopholes,” she said.

First, the entire supply chain for solid rocket fuel precursors is not comprehensively covered. Second, sanctions do not fully address third-country suppliers. Third, the companies actually delivering these materials, both exporters and Russian importers, remain unsanctioned.

“A credible closing of the loopholes therefore requires completing the listing of all solid-fuel chemical precursors, extending compliance obligations to non-EU subsidiaries of EU-based groups, and imposing blocking sanctions on the key foreign producers and Russian importers directly involved in supplying chemicals for the missile program,” Yurchenko said.

Oleksii Plastun, a professor at Sumy State University, said Russia’s ability to maintain critical supply chains often depends on Western firms indirectly tolerating third-country workarounds. “Some sectors, like aviation, have been effectively cut off because Boeing and Airbus enforced restrictions,” he said. “But in others, ‘parallel imports’ and a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach have allowed sanctioned industries to adapt.”

Political Calculus

Asked whether it would be easier to target Uzbekistan than China with sanctions, Yurchenko admitted, “Politically and economically, yes.”

hosts one dominant producer responsible for a major share of Russia’s imports, and its trade links with the EU are modest compared to China’s. “Addressing a single supplier and its affiliated corporate structures would be far easier than engaging in a confrontation with a major global power,” she said.

China, by contrast, is far more deeply integrated with EU markets. “Sanctions on Chinese chemical exporters risk broader diplomatic and economic repercussions and therefore face far greater resistance among some EU member states.”

The Tragic Irony

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih has paid more than $500 million in taxes to Ukraine and allocated over $18 million toward humanitarian aid, direct assistance to civilians affected by missile attacks and rebuilding infrastructure specifically damaged by Russian Iskander strikes.

The company is the economic backbone of Kryvyi Rih, a city increasingly targeted by the very missiles whose production depends on chemicals supplied by a company in the Mittal family orbit.

If Uzbek and major Chinese suppliers were sanctioned, Russia would face difficult alternatives: smaller third country producers with less reliable supply, accelerated but years-away domestic production or attempting to redesign missile propulsion systems, a process requiring extensive testing that would “degrade reliability and take years,” according to Yurchenko.

“If Uzbek and key Chinese suppliers were removed from the market simultaneously, Russia would face a prolonged period of supply instability, higher costs and reduced production flexibility for the Iskander missile program,” she said.

The question remains whether EU policymakers will close sanctions loopholes that allow family business empires to profit from both sides of the war, rebuilding Ukrainian infrastructure while simultaneously supplying chemicals used in the missiles that destroy it.