2025 NSS & Global Recalibration

America has moved beyond the post–World War II framework that long guided its management of international affairs. The second Trump administration’s National Security Strategy formalizes a strategic shift that has been gathering momentum since the Cold War’s end, codifying Washington’s intent to recalibrate its global role. Transferring primary security responsibility to regional allies and partners may address the constraints of the 21st century, but it will also generate new vulnerabilities and second-order effects that Washington cannot fully anticipate. As the United States moves to operationalize this emerging geostrategy, its national security apparatus must bolster institutional capacity for strategic forecasting – a critical capability for anticipating risks, identifying leverage points, and executing policy effectively in an international environment marked by accelerating uncertainty and fluid power dynamics.

The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy unveiled on Dec. 5 lays out three mutually reinforcing pillars that redefine Washington’s global posture. First, accepting that U.S. power cannot be evenly applied across the world, it concentrates attention and resources on the regions and issues that directly shape America’s long-term security and economic position. Second, it seeks to preempt instability by expanding geoeconomic engagement with both partners and rivals, using markets, investment, and supply-chain architecture as tools to manage competition below the threshold of conflict. Third, it aims to sharply reduce U.S. exposure to protracted land wars by shifting military focus to the maritime arena, where control of sea lanes and chokepoints are central to American national and international security.

A month into President Donald Trump’s second term, I published a piece with Geopolitical Futures – The US Geostrategy and the Old World Order – arguing that the United States is in the process of a historic overhaul of its foreign-policy paradigm in response to geopolitical forces that have been building for three decades. I noted that any shift of such magnitude inevitably yields a long, messy, unsettling, and risky transition, as legacy institutions and assumptions resist strategic realignment. Yet such disruption is unavoidable, because addressing emergent threats with instruments designed for a bygone era is unsustainable and in fact dangerous. I also underscored that, despite the turbulence, the current moment is paradoxically advantageous for Washington, as its two principal adversaries, China and Russia, remain preoccupied with profound internal and external constraints.

The Trump NSS identifies the Western Hemisphere and Asia as its two most consequential priority regions. Notably, both are linked by the world’s principal maritime corridors anchored in the Pacific basin, underscoring the logic of an oceanic power orienting its strategy toward these theaters. The shift away from the Eurasian landmass reflects a maturing recognition that Washington can better sustain global security by concentrating on the domains where its comparative advantages are greatest. While allies and partners assume greater responsibility on land, the United States remains the only power capable of deploying a truly global navy – an indispensable asset for securing the North American homeland and shaping the wider international system.

With regards to Europe, most observers have focused on the NSS depiction of the Continent as mired in deep economic, political, and civilizational decline, raising doubts about its long-term reliability as an ally unless these structural trends are reversed. What has received far less attention is the document’s assessment that Europe – despite its heightened threat perception of Russia – possesses more than enough conventional power to manage Moscow without direct U.S. military primacy. Consequently, Washington sees little justification for continuing to shoulder the bulk of Europe’s defense burden and instead envisions shifting to a more supportive, rather than leading, role. Before making that transition, however, the United States must employ its diplomatic weight not only to bring the Ukraine war to a close but also to reestablish strategic stability between the Kremlin and European states.

Similarly, the NSS contends that the Middle East no longer demands the top-tier strategic priority it once commanded. U.S. energy independence, global diversification of energy supplies, and broader geopolitical shifts have reduced the region’s centrality to American national security. Although conflicts endure, particularly in relation to Iran, whose trajectory remains highly uncertain, Washington assesses that threats have been substantially mitigated and that effective policy requires working with regional partners as they are rather than trying to reshape their political systems. The Middle East is increasingly seen as a locus for investment, technological cooperation, and geoeconomic leverage, which will require careful management of the regional balance of power among its key allies: Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, a terribly daunting task, to say the least.

While the NSS effectively rationalizes American foreign-policy priorities, it leans heavily on the Trump Administration’s normative vision of “what the United States should want.” Section II of the report is devoted entirely to articulating these aspirational goals. What ultimately matters, however, is the set of objectives Washington can realistically achieve within the constraints of existing capabilities and geopolitical realities. It is therefore noteworthy and strategically clarifying that the subsequent section grounds the discussion in the practical instruments and capacities available to execute this emerging geostrategy.

The document underscores that stable relations with other states are a prerequisite for functioning global commerce. To minimize the risk of conflict, Washington signals it will no longer pursue large-scale efforts to democratize authoritarian regimes. This reflects a recognition that past attempts at engineering internal political change were failed undertakings and extraordinarily costly ones. Even so, the NSS affirms the enduring utility of American soft power, leaving the administration with the challenge of advancing U.S. norms and values without drifting back into nation-building.

Arguably the most consequential policy dilemma lies in preventing adversaries from exploiting the transitional moment as the United States seeks to construct a new global architecture with an expanded role for regional partners. Russia will likely attempt to capitalize on Europe’s assumption of greater security responsibilities, probing gaps and testing cohesion. Similarly, China has a strategic interest in limiting the ability of East Asian allies to project influence across the vast maritime expanse of the Western Pacific. Meanwhile, Iran, driven by its revisionist ambitions, will seek to exploit divisions among Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, underscoring the need for careful calibration and proactive management of these regional imbalances.

As I noted in my February essay the United States stands at a rare strategic crossroads: seeking to let go of an 80-year-old system that is well past its expiry date while its replacement will be long in the making. By shifting responsibility to capable regional partners, Washington amplifies its reach while accepting the inherent risks and uncertainties of shared security. The ability to anticipate and act decisively will determine the extent to which this recalibration translates ambition into durable influence. If managed wisely, this moment offers the chance to redefine American power for the 21st century, which has to be flexible, resilient, and strategically dominant across the most consequential theaters of the world.