Fugitive Money-Launderer Sentenced to 20 Years in $73M “Cambodia Scam Center” Crypto Fraud

A U.S. federal court has sentenced Daren Li in absentia to 20 years in prison for his role in a $73+ million global cryptocurrency “investment” scam allegedly run from scam centers in Cambodia. Prosecutors say the scheme blended romance/social-engineering with spoofed crypto trading sites—then relied on U.S. shell companies and banking access to convert victims’ wires into crypto rails.

Key Points

• Sentence: 20 years’ imprisonment (statutory maximum) + 3 years’ supervised release, sentenced in absentia.
• Status: Li is a fugitive after allegedly cutting off an ankle monitor and absconding in December 2025.
• Plea: Li pleaded guilty on November 12, 2024 to conspiring to launder proceeds from crypto scams and related fraud.
• Scale: Li admitted the conspiracy caused at least $73.6M in victim funds to be deposited into accounts tied to him and co-conspirators (incl. $59.8M routed via U.S. shell companies).
• Modus operandi: Victims were approached via social media/dating platforms; scammers used encrypted messaging, spoofed “trading” sites, and sometimes fake “tech support” narratives to trigger wires/crypto deposits.

Short Narrative

According to U.S. Department of Justice, the operation was not “just” an online scam—it was an end-to-end cybercrime supply chain. The front end was social engineering: unsolicited outreach, relationship-building, and carefully staged “investment dashboards” hosted on spoofed domains mimicking legitimate crypto platforms.

The back end was financial infrastructure abuse. Li admitted he helped orchestrate the laundering layer by directing others to open U.S. bank accounts for shell companies, monitoring incoming interstate and international wires, and overseeing conversion of victim funds into virtual currency. In other words: the scam’s profitability depended on converting emotional manipulation into banked money—and then into crypto settlement.

Extended Analysis

1) “Cambodia scam centers” are only half the story. The other half is access to Western finance.
The DOJ framing is revealing: the fraud is “carried out from scam centers” in Cambodia, but the laundering hinges on U.S.-based enablers—shell entities, bank onboarding, and payment routing that can absorb large inbound wires without triggering effective interdiction.

2) The case maps cleanly onto the “pig-butchering” typology—then adds a laundering spine.
In the earlier charging phase, DOJ explicitly described the schemes as “pig butchering” and alleged a laundering syndicate moving $73M+ through U.S. financial institutions and onward—partly via offshore banking and conversion to Tether (USDT).
This matters for compliance teams: when USDT (or other stablecoins) becomes the settlement rail, the scam economy gains speed, finality, and cross-border portability—exactly what traditional AML friction is supposed to prevent.

3) The fugitive problem is a feature, not a bug, for transnational fraud networks.
Li’s alleged absconding in December 2025 underscores a recurring operational pattern: once a laundering node is identified, networks shift personnel, wallets, and corporate wrappers faster than mutual legal assistance and extradition timelines can move. Sentencing in absentia delivers deterrence messaging—but it also signals how difficult physical custody can be in globally distributed scam ecosystems.

Call for Information

FinTelegram is tracking the laundering infrastructure behind Cambodia-linked scam centers: shell-company formation, bank onboarding pathways, crypto off-ramps, and stablecoin settlement routes. If you have documents, compliance alerts, bank memos, exchange/KYC records, wallet intelligence, or insider information tied to this network, please submit securely via Whistle42.com (anonymous submissions welcome).