PANews reported on November 11th that ZCash research expert c-node published an article on the X platform stating, "MPC, tFHE, and TEEs can build privacy applications that are impossible to achieve using ZK, but their privacy strength is relatively weak. It is recommended to prioritize pure ZK for applications such as payments, transfers, and voting." Vitalik Buterin responded, "ZK itself cannot provide anti-coercion capabilities; in scenarios such as voting, it still needs to be combined with trusted parties, MPC, FHE, or TEEs to achieve this feature. We can improve system security through a ZK+FHE layered architecture, so that even if FHE is compromised, all privacy attributes except anti-coercion can be retained. I suspect a similar situation applies to almost all other cryptographic application scenarios besides zero-knowledge proofs."PANews reported on November 11th that ZCash research expert c-node published an article on the X platform stating, "MPC, tFHE, and TEEs can build privacy applications that are impossible to achieve using ZK, but their privacy strength is relatively weak. It is recommended to prioritize pure ZK for applications such as payments, transfers, and voting." Vitalik Buterin responded, "ZK itself cannot provide anti-coercion capabilities; in scenarios such as voting, it still needs to be combined with trusted parties, MPC, FHE, or TEEs to achieve this feature. We can improve system security through a ZK+FHE layered architecture, so that even if FHE is compromised, all privacy attributes except anti-coercion can be retained. I suspect a similar situation applies to almost all other cryptographic application scenarios besides zero-knowledge proofs."