President Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) has finally come out. For those who followed Trump’s rhetoric during last year’s presidential campaign, his recent policy pronouncements, couched in one-liners, and the signals from Secretaries Hegseth and Rubio, the NSS offers no surprises. 

In Trump’s worldview, Fortress America has been breached, distracted by its role as the global policeman, the erosion of its industrial prowess due to globalization, and the social cost of illegal mass migration across its borders. Its defenses have been weakened by a lack of focus on its core national interests and the diversion of its resources to support its allies and partners in various parts of the world. 

Trump is threatened by the narcotics traffic entering the US heartland through its porous borders with Canada and Mexico, and from Venezuela by sea. He is wary of Chinese inroads in continental America, particularly through malign investments, such as the case of the Panama Canal, which is a vital access point for moving the US Navy from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. 

Trump envisions a strategic retreat from the current conflict or crisis areas: the Ukraine-Russian conflict in Europe, Israel’s entanglements in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, and a potential crisis in Taiwan. His retreat requires rear-guard action from its allies and partners to avert a total collapse of the international order forged at Bretton Woods before the end of WW2. This is why he compelled NATO members to increase their defense spending to 5% of GDP, and tried the same approach with its Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese allies.   

The trajectory of the new NSS might lead to unintended consequences. At its worst, we will see the rise of various spheres of influence across the globe:

• a continental America dominated by the US
• a Europe divided between Russia and the NATO states
• a highly balkanized Middle East made up of Israel and the surrounding Muslim states
• an Indo-Pacific showdown between China and America’s allies and partners holding the line. At best, we can foresee the emergence of minilateral arrangements compensating for a reduced US presence in the Indo-Pacific. Such arrangements are ad hoc and agile set-ups that can respond to specific regional concerns without the burden of too many obligations under a NATO-like structure.  

In the Indo-Pacific alone, the geopolitics of the region can lead to its break up to three sub-spheres of influence: (1) a South Asia with China and India competing along the line of control and in the Indian Ocean, (2) in East Asia with China against the first island chain states of Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and perhaps South Korea, (3) in the mid-Pacific with Australia, New Zealand and France checking against Chinese influence among the island-states. 

However, the country still benefits from America’s interest in keeping the South China Sea open to maritime traffic and in maintaining the status quo in Taiwan. As per the Bretton Woods accord, the US Navy remains the guarantor of the security of the global commons. However, the dismal state of the US shipbuilding capability has degraded the US Navy’s ability to respond to different crises at the same time. In East Asia, it has created a ‘regional imbalance of naval power’ that has allowed China effective control over the South China Sea. Its efforts to restore its defense industrial base will take time, and it has no guarantee of immediate success. Some effects of globalization on First World economies are simply difficult to reverse. 

Alternative approaches

How will the Philippines navigate these shifts in America’s national security posture and reduced naval capabilities? What should be our adjustments in terms of expectations with the PH-US alliance? What are alternative approaches to mitigate a reduced US commitment in the region and to the country? 

For the country, there are five national security imperatives it needs to address: restoring control over the WPS to resume unfettered access to our EEZ for economic purposes; establishing a robust industrial base to support the capacity-building of the AFP and the PCG; strengthening our defense posture in Northern Luzon to deter and disrupt China’s calculations along the Bashi Channel; defending the homeland and society against CCP attempts to destabilize the country from within; and using our unique “convening power” to work with like-minded states in establishing a Northeast Asian Security Dialogue.

First off, the recent activation of the AFP’s Strategic Defense Command (SDC) and the INDOPACOM’s Task Force Philippines provides the opportunity to set up a PH-US Combined Maritime Force. Such a force should be able to provide a command and control, and intelligence-sharing mechanism to manage the joint sea and air patrols of the navies, air force, and coast guard units from the Philippines, the US, and other strategic partners. It can be tasked with increasing presence in the WPS towards a 24/7 operational rhythm, initially to create a buffer, then gradually to push encroaching Chinese ships away from our EEZ and key isles and features.

Second, we need to work with Japan, South Korea and perhaps even India to restore our shipbuilding capability and develop the industrial ecosystem to manufacture our own drones. Also, we hope that the US National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2026 would  fill in the shortfall in the AFP’s share of the General Appropriations (GAA) to enhance a wide range of  external defense capabilities. This will allow us to incrementally build the means to support a “denial strategy” in the WPS in accordance with the SND’s Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept. 

Third, we should synchronize our homeland defense needs, the conduct of periodic multilateral exercises, the acquisition of long-range fires capabilities, and the enhancement of our maritime domain awareness to “harden” our military posture in the Batanes Group of Islands, and in the provinces of Ilocos Norte, Cagayan, and Isabela. In principle, it is better to deter China today, rather than suffer a future political crisis should a situation arise that requires the US to ask our government to use our northern provinces as a launch pad for defensive operations in Taiwan. 

Fourth, we need to do a better job at countering the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) disinformation activities, cyber-attacks, and the targeted cooptation of key government institutions and officials, local politicians, Filipino-Chinese communities, businesses, and schools, among others. The CCP’s united front work efforts are designed to infiltrate democratic states and societies, subvert them from within, and shape the political discourse in support of their interests. Like the local communist movement, this challenge requires a whole-of-nation approach to address its pervasive effects within our bureaucracy and in society. 

Lastly, we need to seriously consider the establishment of a NATO-like structure that looks at the region as a single theater of operations. It should provide strategic direction, synchronize naval, air, and coast guard operations, and implement a holistic approach to counter China’s anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) advantage. It should also enhance the economic resiliency of participating states and resolve their supply chain issues that impinges on national security. The Northeast Asian Security Dialogue could include the Philippines, along with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and perhaps Taiwan as an observer state. 

In summary, Trump’s National Security Strategy should not be a cause for despair. Rather, it compels countries such as the Philippines to develop their own courses of  action based on their core national interest, and a workaround to mitigate against a very volatile and uncertain regional environment. At the end of the day, Filipinos should rely on themselves in shaping their own future, in building the national will to protect is sovereign rights and defend their sovereignty, and in pushing back against those who place their countrymen in harm’s way. – Rappler.com

Rommel Jude G Ong is a retired Rear Admiral of the Philippine Navy, who ended his service as its Vice Commander.