[DECODED] X’s geolocation feature isn’t perfect or transparent, and that makes it problematic

On November 23, Nikita Bier, head of product at Elon Musk’s social media platform X, announced that the platform would be introducing a feature that would let users see the country or region where an account on X is based.

The feature, which follows in the footsteps of similar ones on Facebook and YouTube, is meant as “an important first step to securing the integrity of the global town square” by helping clamp down and monitor inauthentic engagement. 

The question becomes a matter of determining whether it will work as advertised and what capabilities and limitations X’s geolocation feature will have for its users.

Geolocation at a glance

Geolocation is the process of identifying where a computer or other computing device is located using one or a number of data collection mechanisms. 

According to Google’s own definition of geolocation, “most geolocation services use network routing addresses or internal GPS chips to determine this location.”

Lack of clarity on how X geolocation works

How does X’s geolocation work, though? It’s not entirely clear. 

According to Jan Kammerath, who tested some of the limits of the system, it appears the geolocation notices are done in batches as new accounts using virtual private networks to base them in Vaduz in Liechtenstein did not immediately get tagged with geolocation.

Bier said in a post, “If any data is incorrect, it will be updated periodically based on best available information. This happens on a delayed and randomized schedule to preserve privacy.”

This would mean that the geolocation checks are time-bound and could thus be different if a person is, for example, traveling elsewhere when an update to the geolocation checks occurs.

Bier later said on November 24 that in an update by November 25, “accuracy will be nearly 99.99%.”

Online reactions to X’s new feature

The Nerve looked at public X posts from November 21 to 28 mentioning the new X location feature, and found about 192,790 English posts.

Based on the scan, the biggest topic clusters (about 17%) contained a mix of humor and outrage at the new feature. Many users found it entertaining that the feature is exposing grifters, fake Americans, and deceptive accounts, while others mocked X CEO and owner Elon Musk for using it as a sort of manual bot purge; others, meanwhile, praised it as one of X’s best updates.

The scan also noted how there were concerns regarding the feature’s privacy risks, issues on accuracy, and the potential for political misuse, while warnings were posted about potential xenophobia and issues with user safety and privacy. Some posts have also raised legal and data-protection questions, with a call for stronger privacy-preserving alternatives.

Meanwhile, about 4.9% of the posts in the scan were about exposing fake accounts and bot networks. Israel (1.46%) is mentioned primarily in relation to controversy over US government accounts appearing to be based there. Gaza journalists (2.1%) are also mentioned, largely in the context of confusion, false accusations, and disinformation triggered by the X geolocation update.

The propensity for racist discourse

The Nerve’s scan of X posts showed racist discourse has also happened following the release of the feature.

About 5% of the posts also point out that the feature has intensified xenophobia, country-based hate, and identity policing, with people suddenly treating X’s location feature as proof of ethnicity.

The feature has also surfaced racist narratives, with India as the most mentioned country in the dataset (5.8%), followed by Nigeria and Bangladesh (1.4%), Pakistan (2.3%), Ukraine (2%), and the United Kingdom (0.39%).

Sowing doubt on authenticity

X’s geolocation update, as a result, sows doubt on the authenticity of posts made by accounts on X. This is both seen as a potential accountability measure, as well as a means of weaponizing geolocation results to “prove” people are liars.

How does sowing doubt on the authenticity of an account work as an accountability measure?

In The Nerve’s report on the Southport riots, we dealt with analyzing the UK’s anti-immigrant disinformation ecosystem. 

Our move to catalogue these was an accountability measure meant to show that actors outside the regions being discussed were spurring on anti-immigrant discussions while asserting they were from the United Kingdom while not being from there at all.

The Nerve identified at least 26 verified accounts posting anti-immigrant narratives. Of these, we found six accounts that are based in countries that are not the United Kingdom, according to X’s new geolocation feature.

Three were found to be based in Europe (Netherlands, Italy, and Serbia), two in the US, and one in Thailand. 

The accounts that bear UK-related flags on their display names (@HerdImmunity12 and @whitepilledpage), specifically, are based in Thailand and the United States, respectively. 

@HerdImmunity12 has both the UK and US flags in its display name, and has a bio note saying, “✝️ Pro SME, TRUMP, MAGA, minimal state interference, #LeaveWEF, affordable energy.” The disclosed location it has on its account is Great Britain. It is still posting anti-immigrant content as of November 2025.

Meanwhile, @whitepilledpage bears the national flag of England, also known as the St. George’s Cross, which has been associated with the far right. It is also still posting anti-immigrant content as of November 2025.

Weaponizing this feature however, works in much the same way — by asserting that someone who is clearly in a given location is actually lying based on X’s geolocation feature.

For instance, the Israel Foreign Ministry said on X on November 23 that journalist Motasem Dalloul — reporting on the attacks against Gaza — was operating out of Poland based on the geolocation tag in his account.

Dalloul has already gone on the record with video showing him in Gaza and has spoken about using an international SIM card on his phone due to the destruction of Gaza’s telecommunications infrastructure. 

Aside from skepticism, ‘trust but verify’ is paramount

As journalist Hala Jaber explained on X: “Gaza’s shattered internet runs on donated eSIMs that route through Europe, including Poland. VPNs, failovers, & network glitches only make misidentification easier. X itself said the feature isn’t reliable & even paused its rollout.”

She went on to say that pro-Israeli accounts “aren’t making a good-faith mistake.”

“They’re weaponizing a known technical quirk to smear a Palestinian journalist & pro-Palestinian accounts because their reporting is inconvenient.”

While X’s geolocation feature is welcome in its bid to create transparency, there should also be transparent notes detailing how it operates and what its limitations are.

The geolocation feature, as a side effect, ends up acting as an enabler of engagement farming or clickbait as people discuss the feature and push back on perceived fakery or inauthenticity on X.

It’s hard to trust what you cannot verify, and while black boxes in big tech are normal, they are not always welcome. Having healthy skepticism in this case may be the smart move.

Without proper safeguards, X’s geolocation feature is a weapon to be wielded by bad actors aiming to create confusion at its worst. At best, it can be a means of opening up the discussion on how transparency and accountability are sorely needed on social media. – with reports from Pauline Macaraeg/Rappler.com