When Judicial Rhetoric Collides with Federal Rules: The Default That Cannot Be Ignored Introduction In the federal civil rights case *Lathus v. Round Valley Justice Court et al* (3:24‑cv‑08233), a peculiar contradiction appeared on the record—one that highlights not only procedural mismanagement but also a potential abuse of judicial discretion. The images provided capture the core problem: Judge Dominic W. Lanza stated there was no First Amended Complaint*, yet simultaneously treated the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) as operative. This contradiction is more than semantics—it’s a fatal procedural flaw that defaults the case back to the original complaint (Dkt. 1). Since that complaint was properly served and unanswered, default is mandatory under Rule 55. The Contradiction Exposed The image excerpt states: > ”He said there was no First Amended Complaint yet treated the SAC as operative — which is procedurally impossible. That leaves your original Complaint (Dkt. 1), properly served and unanswered, as the operative pleading — meaning default is mandatory.” This highlights the inescapable reality: 1. No First Amended Complaint — By Judge Lanza’s own words, there was no valid First Amended Complaint to bridge the original complaint (Dkt. 1) and the SAC. 2. SAC Deemed Operative Anyway — Despite acknowledging the absence of a valid first amendment, the SAC was treated as operative. But procedurally, an SAC cannot leapfrog into existence without an FAC. 3. Original Complaint Remains Controlling — The original complaint, filed as Dkt. 1, was served by U.S. Marshals (pursuant to Doc. 105) and went unanswered by the defendants. This makes default under Rule 55(a) mandatory. Jurisdiction Stripped, Yet Orders Issued The second image clarifies the fatal timing error: > “On top of that, his Termination Order (Dkt. 149) came after you filed your interlocutory appeal and mandamus petitions, when jurisdiction had already shifted. Under Griggs, the order is void.” On August 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal (Dkt. 144). On August 13, 2025, the Ninth Circuit issued case numbers confirming jurisdiction transfer. On August 15, 2025, Judge Lanza nevertheless issued Dkt. 149—an order terminating the SAC. Under Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.*, 459 U.S. 56 (1982), once an appeal is filed, the district court is divested of jurisdiction over the matters on appeal. Lanza’s termination order was, therefore, ultra vires (beyond his authority) and void ab initio. Why This Matters: The Mandated Default When a complaint is properly served and goes unanswered: * Rule 55(a) requires the Clerk to enter default. * Rule 55(b) allows entry of default judgment. * Rule 8(b)(6) further solidifies that unanswered allegations are deemed admitted. Thus, by procedural law, the Dkt. 1 complaint now stands as admitted fact. The Defendants’ silence is not strategy; it is forfeiture. No amount of judicial rhetoric can change that. Conclusion: A Record of Rigging The record now contains undeniable proof of judicial contradiction: * Admitting no First Amended Complaint existed. * Treating the SAC as operative anyway. * Ignoring a properly served, unanswered Dkt. 1 complaint. * Issuing a termination order after jurisdiction had shifted. This is more than error; it is evidence of bias and possible collusion. Defaults are designed to protect plaintiffs from exactly this kind of manipulation. The law is unambiguous: default is mandatory, and Judge Lanza’s order is void. This case may ultimately become a textbook example of how judicial overreach collides with the immovable force of procedural law. When Judicial Rhetoric Collides with Federal Rules: The Default That Cannot Be Ignored was originally published in Coinmonks on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this storyWhen Judicial Rhetoric Collides with Federal Rules: The Default That Cannot Be Ignored Introduction In the federal civil rights case *Lathus v. Round Valley Justice Court et al* (3:24‑cv‑08233), a peculiar contradiction appeared on the record—one that highlights not only procedural mismanagement but also a potential abuse of judicial discretion. The images provided capture the core problem: Judge Dominic W. Lanza stated there was no First Amended Complaint*, yet simultaneously treated the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) as operative. This contradiction is more than semantics—it’s a fatal procedural flaw that defaults the case back to the original complaint (Dkt. 1). Since that complaint was properly served and unanswered, default is mandatory under Rule 55. The Contradiction Exposed The image excerpt states: > ”He said there was no First Amended Complaint yet treated the SAC as operative — which is procedurally impossible. That leaves your original Complaint (Dkt. 1), properly served and unanswered, as the operative pleading — meaning default is mandatory.” This highlights the inescapable reality: 1. No First Amended Complaint — By Judge Lanza’s own words, there was no valid First Amended Complaint to bridge the original complaint (Dkt. 1) and the SAC. 2. SAC Deemed Operative Anyway — Despite acknowledging the absence of a valid first amendment, the SAC was treated as operative. But procedurally, an SAC cannot leapfrog into existence without an FAC. 3. Original Complaint Remains Controlling — The original complaint, filed as Dkt. 1, was served by U.S. Marshals (pursuant to Doc. 105) and went unanswered by the defendants. This makes default under Rule 55(a) mandatory. Jurisdiction Stripped, Yet Orders Issued The second image clarifies the fatal timing error: > “On top of that, his Termination Order (Dkt. 149) came after you filed your interlocutory appeal and mandamus petitions, when jurisdiction had already shifted. Under Griggs, the order is void.” On August 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal (Dkt. 144). On August 13, 2025, the Ninth Circuit issued case numbers confirming jurisdiction transfer. On August 15, 2025, Judge Lanza nevertheless issued Dkt. 149—an order terminating the SAC. Under Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.*, 459 U.S. 56 (1982), once an appeal is filed, the district court is divested of jurisdiction over the matters on appeal. Lanza’s termination order was, therefore, ultra vires (beyond his authority) and void ab initio. Why This Matters: The Mandated Default When a complaint is properly served and goes unanswered: * Rule 55(a) requires the Clerk to enter default. * Rule 55(b) allows entry of default judgment. * Rule 8(b)(6) further solidifies that unanswered allegations are deemed admitted. Thus, by procedural law, the Dkt. 1 complaint now stands as admitted fact. The Defendants’ silence is not strategy; it is forfeiture. No amount of judicial rhetoric can change that. Conclusion: A Record of Rigging The record now contains undeniable proof of judicial contradiction: * Admitting no First Amended Complaint existed. * Treating the SAC as operative anyway. * Ignoring a properly served, unanswered Dkt. 1 complaint. * Issuing a termination order after jurisdiction had shifted. This is more than error; it is evidence of bias and possible collusion. Defaults are designed to protect plaintiffs from exactly this kind of manipulation. The law is unambiguous: default is mandatory, and Judge Lanza’s order is void. This case may ultimately become a textbook example of how judicial overreach collides with the immovable force of procedural law. When Judicial Rhetoric Collides with Federal Rules: The Default That Cannot Be Ignored was originally published in Coinmonks on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story