Design and asymmetric war today

(Part One)

Drones already shifted the odds against Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian war within months of the invasion of Ukrainian territory.

After the Ukraine surprised Russia and the world with the emergence of its unlikely and startlingly effective war-time president, Volodymyr Zelensky, it proceeded to pit knowledge of territory against a WW2-style column of Russian tanks. The tanks mired by the hundreds in the mud were a portrait of superpower folly.

The Russian expectation of a quick conquest was extraordinary miscalculation. (The American expectation of quick regime change in Iran this year was this, too. More on that in Part Two.) Russia’s Vladimir Putin rests only on bigness in an asymmetric contest. This was/is grave imprudence.

Within a few months of the invasion, with observers already aware of pivotally successful Ukrainian drone assaults on incoming soldiers and their weapons and transport, the classic logic of disproportionate might prevailing was upended. At least for this war. At least for that time.

The hobbyist drone “pilots” proved more disciplined, agile, and gung-ho than both the poor Russian conscript (who did not at the start know they were being sent to war in another country) and the thug Wagner army-for-hire deployed for shock and awe campaigns. In hindsight, this disparity seems inevitable.

Nearly all amateur stuff at the start, drone improvement and industrial production accelerated beyond all previous imaginings of real-life, unmanned weapons-delivery systems. Ukraine changed the game.

By June 2025, last year, five Russian airbases — hundreds of miles apart, deep within Russian territory — were simultaneously attacked by PFV drones operated in a covert plan named “Spiderweb.” The drones wrecked or otherwise disabled $7 billion worth of jet fighters and their capacity to rain hell on both military and civilian targets from the Ukrainian skies.

The “Spiderweb” drone attacks on the Belaya, Dyagilevo, Olenya, and Ivanovo military bases, and others located in the Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ryazan, and Amur regions, suddenly exhibited a massive escalation of Ukrainian drone capability. Asymmetric war can now mean cheap ways to destroy the most expensive military tech.

It is a new, realistic logic. And: “This is a turning point,” one Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba Bespeky Ukrayiny) source asserted. “Our drones are now reaching far into the enemy’s rear, where the planes that drop bombs on our civilians take off. Their impunity is over.”

At present, there are stunning design achievements. Ukrainian An-28 aircraft fitted out with six external drone interceptor drone mounts (three per wing) can launch these “after a Russian drone is detected and then guided toward it using an onboard camera similar to a first-person view (FPV) system, intercepting the target by detonating on impact.”

The Kyiv Post reiterates the significance of “cheaper”: “The concept is intended as a cheaper alternative to air-to-air missiles, relying instead on smaller, lower-cost interceptor drones launched from the air. Launching interceptor drones from aerial platforms, rather than ground-based systems, also means greater flexibility, reducing flight times and improving target tracking as Russian forces continuously adjust drone flight paths.”

The AN-28 was short haul cargo and passenger aircraft: old tech, twin-engine. It is now repurposed for war missions to hunt down Russian drones, equipped with M134 miniguns, to deploy the interceptor drones.

“The An-28, reported by TF1, is part of Ukraine’s broader effort to find cost-effective ways to counter threats from low-cost kamikaze drones.”

Still, Russia-deployed Shahed missiles, imported from Iran at the cost of $20,000 each (contrast this with $7 million for a US Patriot missile) exercise significant superiority in the war of drones at present. Russia now produces their own, same type drones at $35,000 each; and is revving up production.

Ukraine’s 3D-printed interceptor drones often cost $1,500 at the cheapest level. These currently bring down 40% of the Shahed drones over the Ukraine — up from only 25% late 2025. The percentage will have to be upped by Ukrainian designers, by paying attention to the ways drones are directed digitally and other parts of an entire system that includes human savvy.

In this designer versus designer combat, no winners can still be predicted. But it is clear that humongous expense is not necessarily the winning design principle, nor non-negotiable design assumption.

Here is a summary of the current state-of-flux, provided by Reuters: “…one of the major challenges was Russia’s use of AI to create fresh approaches and flight plans, making it hard for Ukraine to keep up…[Russians] also use ‘mesh networks,’ where a group of drones act as signal transmitters to one another in grids spanning over 120 km, allowing them to defeat Ukrainian navigation jamming.”

“On the plus side, Ukrainian interception efforts were receiving a boost from an unlikely source: remote working. Some top pilots now fly interceptors remotely via internet link in multiple regions across Ukraine, switching instantly between video feeds, Cherevashenko said. Support staff on the ground set up the drones and signal antennae, but the pilot can be anywhere.”

Russian drones can accelerate to speeds beyond the capacity of Ukrainian interceptors to catch up. It is expected, of course, that this acceleration gap will be closed quickly by Ukrainian designers.

A class of Ukrainian drones now fly kamikaze runs with real time visuals of the place, instead of relying on digitally delivered (and detectable) target information.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is now able to sell its drones to new and old actors in current theaters of war. Also: the US Pentagon is integrating Ukrainian battlefield experience into its own drone-centric, deep-strike asymmetric war modeling. The design of warfare itself is changing: from the technology itself to the acknowledgement of why the contest is unequal; and devising ways to turn drawbacks into opportunity.

(To be continued.)

Marian Pastor Roces is an independent curator and critic of institutions. Her body of work addresses the intersection of culture and politics.