On September 23rd, UXLINK was attacked due to a leak of its multi-signature wallet private key. The attacker minted UXLINK tokens and sold them for over $11.3 million. The Beosin security team conducted vulnerability analysis and fund tracing for this attack, and share their findings below: Event Review The UXLINK contract's private key was leaked, resulting in the attacker's address being added as a multi-signature account for the contract and removing all other existing multi-signature accounts. Furthermore, the contract's signature threshold was reset to 1, allowing only the attacker's address to sign to execute contract operations, giving the attacker complete control over the contract. Subsequently, the attacker began issuing additional UXLINK tokens and selling them for profit. The attacker issued five additional tokens. The three token receiving addresses, 0xeff9cefdedb2a34b9e9e371bda0bf8db8b7eb9a7, 0x2ef43c1d0c88c071d242b6c2d0430e1751607b87, and 0x78786a967ee948aea1ccd3150f973cf07d9864f3, exchanged UXLINK tokens for ETH and DAI through currency exchange, transfer, and cross-chain storage, and stored them on the ETH chain address. Stolen Funds Tracking The following is an analysis by the Beosin security team on the main flows of funds in this security incident: ARBITRUM CHAIN Hacker address: 0x6385eb73fae34bf90ed4c3d4c8afbc957ff4121c Stolen address: 0xCe82784d2E6C838c9b390A14a79B70d644F615EB Approximate amount stolen: 904,401 USDT After stealing the funds, the hacker converted 904,401 USDT into 215.71 ETH and transferred the ETH to the Ethereum address 0x6385eb73fae34bf90ed4c3d4c8afbc957ff4121c via cross-chain. Ethereum chain Hacker address: 0x6385eb73fae34bf90ed4c3d4c8afbc957ff4121c Stolen addresses: 0x4457d81a97ab6074468da95f4c0c452924267da5, 0x8676d208484899f5448ad6e8b19792d21e5dc14f, 0x561f7ced7e85c597ad712db4d73e796a4f767654 Approximate stolen funds: 25.27 ETH, 5,564,402.99 USDT, 3.7 WBTC, 500,000 USDC After stealing the funds, the hacker exchanged 5,564,402.99 USDT and 500,000 USDC into 6,068,370.29 DAI, and finally transferred the funds to the address 0xac77b44a5f3acc54e3844a609fffd64f182ef931. The current balance of this address is: 240.99 ETH, 6,068,370.29 DAI, and 3.7 WBTC. The main capital flows of Ethereum and Arbitrum are shown in the figure below: According to Beosin Trace analysis, all stolen funds are still stored in multiple addresses of the attacker. Beosin Trace has blacklisted all addresses associated with the attacker and is continuing to track them. The following is the current balance of the attacker's related addresses: On September 23rd, UXLINK was attacked due to a leak of its multi-signature wallet private key. The attacker minted UXLINK tokens and sold them for over $11.3 million. The Beosin security team conducted vulnerability analysis and fund tracing for this attack, and share their findings below: Event Review The UXLINK contract's private key was leaked, resulting in the attacker's address being added as a multi-signature account for the contract and removing all other existing multi-signature accounts. Furthermore, the contract's signature threshold was reset to 1, allowing only the attacker's address to sign to execute contract operations, giving the attacker complete control over the contract. Subsequently, the attacker began issuing additional UXLINK tokens and selling them for profit. The attacker issued five additional tokens. The three token receiving addresses, 0xeff9cefdedb2a34b9e9e371bda0bf8db8b7eb9a7, 0x2ef43c1d0c88c071d242b6c2d0430e1751607b87, and 0x78786a967ee948aea1ccd3150f973cf07d9864f3, exchanged UXLINK tokens for ETH and DAI through currency exchange, transfer, and cross-chain storage, and stored them on the ETH chain address. Stolen Funds Tracking The following is an analysis by the Beosin security team on the main flows of funds in this security incident: ARBITRUM CHAIN Hacker address: 0x6385eb73fae34bf90ed4c3d4c8afbc957ff4121c Stolen address: 0xCe82784d2E6C838c9b390A14a79B70d644F615EB Approximate amount stolen: 904,401 USDT After stealing the funds, the hacker converted 904,401 USDT into 215.71 ETH and transferred the ETH to the Ethereum address 0x6385eb73fae34bf90ed4c3d4c8afbc957ff4121c via cross-chain. Ethereum chain Hacker address: 0x6385eb73fae34bf90ed4c3d4c8afbc957ff4121c Stolen addresses: 0x4457d81a97ab6074468da95f4c0c452924267da5, 0x8676d208484899f5448ad6e8b19792d21e5dc14f, 0x561f7ced7e85c597ad712db4d73e796a4f767654 Approximate stolen funds: 25.27 ETH, 5,564,402.99 USDT, 3.7 WBTC, 500,000 USDC After stealing the funds, the hacker exchanged 5,564,402.99 USDT and 500,000 USDC into 6,068,370.29 DAI, and finally transferred the funds to the address 0xac77b44a5f3acc54e3844a609fffd64f182ef931. The current balance of this address is: 240.99 ETH, 6,068,370.29 DAI, and 3.7 WBTC. The main capital flows of Ethereum and Arbitrum are shown in the figure below: According to Beosin Trace analysis, all stolen funds are still stored in multiple addresses of the attacker. Beosin Trace has blacklisted all addresses associated with the attacker and is continuing to track them. The following is the current balance of the attacker's related addresses:

Losses exceed tens of millions of dollars: UXLINK security incident vulnerability analysis and stolen funds tracking

2025/09/24 13:00
2 min read
For feedback or concerns regarding this content, please contact us at crypto.news@mexc.com

On September 23rd, UXLINK was attacked due to a leak of its multi-signature wallet private key. The attacker minted UXLINK tokens and sold them for over $11.3 million. The Beosin security team conducted vulnerability analysis and fund tracing for this attack, and share their findings below:

Event Review

The UXLINK contract's private key was leaked, resulting in the attacker's address being added as a multi-signature account for the contract and removing all other existing multi-signature accounts. Furthermore, the contract's signature threshold was reset to 1, allowing only the attacker's address to sign to execute contract operations, giving the attacker complete control over the contract. Subsequently, the attacker began issuing additional UXLINK tokens and selling them for profit.

The attacker issued five additional tokens. The three token receiving addresses, 0xeff9cefdedb2a34b9e9e371bda0bf8db8b7eb9a7, 0x2ef43c1d0c88c071d242b6c2d0430e1751607b87, and 0x78786a967ee948aea1ccd3150f973cf07d9864f3, exchanged UXLINK tokens for ETH and DAI through currency exchange, transfer, and cross-chain storage, and stored them on the ETH chain address.

Stolen Funds Tracking

The following is an analysis by the Beosin security team on the main flows of funds in this security incident:

ARBITRUM CHAIN

Hacker address: 0x6385eb73fae34bf90ed4c3d4c8afbc957ff4121c

Stolen address: 0xCe82784d2E6C838c9b390A14a79B70d644F615EB

Approximate amount stolen: 904,401 USDT

After stealing the funds, the hacker converted 904,401 USDT into 215.71 ETH and transferred the ETH to the Ethereum address 0x6385eb73fae34bf90ed4c3d4c8afbc957ff4121c via cross-chain.

Ethereum chain

Hacker address: 0x6385eb73fae34bf90ed4c3d4c8afbc957ff4121c

Stolen addresses: 0x4457d81a97ab6074468da95f4c0c452924267da5, 0x8676d208484899f5448ad6e8b19792d21e5dc14f, 0x561f7ced7e85c597ad712db4d73e796a4f767654

Approximate stolen funds: 25.27 ETH, 5,564,402.99 USDT, 3.7 WBTC, 500,000 USDC

After stealing the funds, the hacker exchanged 5,564,402.99 USDT and 500,000 USDC into 6,068,370.29 DAI, and finally transferred the funds to the address 0xac77b44a5f3acc54e3844a609fffd64f182ef931. The current balance of this address is: 240.99 ETH, 6,068,370.29 DAI, and 3.7 WBTC.

The main capital flows of Ethereum and Arbitrum are shown in the figure below:

 According to Beosin Trace analysis, all stolen funds are still stored in multiple addresses of the attacker.

Beosin Trace has blacklisted all addresses associated with the attacker and is continuing to track them. The following is the current balance of the attacker's related addresses:

Market Opportunity
USDCoin Logo
USDCoin Price(USDC)
$0.9999
$0.9999$0.9999
+0.02%
USD
USDCoin (USDC) Live Price Chart
Disclaimer: The articles reposted on this site are sourced from public platforms and are provided for informational purposes only. They do not necessarily reflect the views of MEXC. All rights remain with the original authors. If you believe any content infringes on third-party rights, please contact crypto.news@mexc.com for removal. MEXC makes no guarantees regarding the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the content and is not responsible for any actions taken based on the information provided. The content does not constitute financial, legal, or other professional advice, nor should it be considered a recommendation or endorsement by MEXC.

You May Also Like

The Channel Factories We’ve Been Waiting For

The Channel Factories We’ve Been Waiting For

The post The Channel Factories We’ve Been Waiting For appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com. Visions of future technology are often prescient about the broad strokes while flubbing the details. The tablets in “2001: A Space Odyssey” do indeed look like iPads, but you never see the astronauts paying for subscriptions or wasting hours on Candy Crush.  Channel factories are one vision that arose early in the history of the Lightning Network to address some challenges that Lightning has faced from the beginning. Despite having grown to become Bitcoin’s most successful layer-2 scaling solution, with instant and low-fee payments, Lightning’s scale is limited by its reliance on payment channels. Although Lightning shifts most transactions off-chain, each payment channel still requires an on-chain transaction to open and (usually) another to close. As adoption grows, pressure on the blockchain grows with it. The need for a more scalable approach to managing channels is clear. Channel factories were supposed to meet this need, but where are they? In 2025, subnetworks are emerging that revive the impetus of channel factories with some new details that vastly increase their potential. They are natively interoperable with Lightning and achieve greater scale by allowing a group of participants to open a shared multisig UTXO and create multiple bilateral channels, which reduces the number of on-chain transactions and improves capital efficiency. Achieving greater scale by reducing complexity, Ark and Spark perform the same function as traditional channel factories with new designs and additional capabilities based on shared UTXOs.  Channel Factories 101 Channel factories have been around since the inception of Lightning. A factory is a multiparty contract where multiple users (not just two, as in a Dryja-Poon channel) cooperatively lock funds in a single multisig UTXO. They can open, close and update channels off-chain without updating the blockchain for each operation. Only when participants leave or the factory dissolves is an on-chain transaction…
Share
BitcoinEthereumNews2025/09/18 00:09
‘Customers are awake’- Eric Trump slams banks over stablecoin yield opposition

‘Customers are awake’- Eric Trump slams banks over stablecoin yield opposition

The post ‘Customers are awake’- Eric Trump slams banks over stablecoin yield opposition appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com. Eric Trump, the son of U.S. President
Share
BitcoinEthereumNews2026/03/05 18:19
Pi Network (PI) climbs on Pi Day update, token unlocks risk

Pi Network (PI) climbs on Pi Day update, token unlocks risk

Pi Network (PI) rally as Bitcoin meets $74,000 resistance Pi Network’s PI outperformed the broader crypto market, notching a multi-week high while Bitcoin stalled
Share
CoinLive2026/03/05 18:39