Antagonists must pipe down their megaphone diplomacy to muddle to an MOU in Hormuz — Phar Kim Beng

JUNE 29 — Wars rarely end with a single signature, a handshake, or a triumphant declaration from political leaders.

More often than not, they end through a gradual process in which each side repeatedly adjusts its expectations of victory and survival until an armistice becomes more valuable than escalation.

This appears to be the stage that the United States and Iran have now entered.

The apparent understanding reached between Washington and Tehran to pause a fresh round of violence has not produced peace in the conventional sense. 

But to stand down, both or more sides cannot keep yelling or resorting to megaphone diplomacy. The MOU cannot stand a high decibel shouting match.

For now the MOU has instead produced something more fragile but equally important: a temporary equilibrium born of exhaustion, strategic caution and mutual recognition that neither side can achieve all of its objectives through military means alone.

Recent clashes in and around the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf demonstrated the dangers of allowing ambiguity to govern military operations in one of the world's most strategically important waterways. 

Miscalculation in such confined and heavily militarized waters can rapidly transform tactical incidents into regional crises with global economic consequences.

Yet these confrontations also revealed an important reality.

Both sides were not merely exchanging blows. They were simultaneously attempting to define the boundaries of an emerging memorandum of understanding----through shouting matches followed by bombings to follow through their shrill rhetoric of war---whose terms remain deliberately vague and politically elastic.

In effect, the battlefield became an extension of the negotiating table. A noisy one.

Iran sought to demonstrate that it retains the ability to impose costs on its adversaries and disrupt maritime traffic if it feels cornered. 

The United States, for its part, attempted to show that military pressure remains available while avoiding actions that could trigger a broader regional war involving multiple state and non-state actors.

Neither side achieved outright victory.

Neither side suffered outright defeat.

That very ambiguity may now become the foundation for diplomacy.

Armistices survive not because they satisfy everyone but because they provide enough flexibility for each side to claim that its core interests remain protected.

The benchmark of success therefore cannot remain static.

If Washington continues to insist upon complete strategic capitulation from Tehran while Iran continues to pursue maximalist demands regarding sanctions relief, nuclear enrichment and regional influence, negotiations will almost certainly collapse under the weight of incompatible expectations.

Instead, both parties must progressively redefine what constitutes acceptable compromise.

For the United States, the benchmark may gradually shift from eliminating every aspect of Iran's nuclear capabilities to preventing the acquisition of a deployable nuclear weapon through inspections, transparency measures and restrictions on enrichment levels.

For Iran, the benchmark may evolve from complete freedom of action to securing economic normalisation, sanctions relief and guarantees against attempts at regime change.

This is not idealism.

It is the practical mathematics of conflict termination.

History shows that adversaries often reach settlements only after abandoning their original war aims in favour of more limited and attainable objectives.

The Korean Armistice of 1953 did not resolve ideological rivalry on the peninsula.

The ceasefire between Thailand  and Cambodia in 2025 did not eliminate mutual suspicion at each other's capitals.

The Dayton Accords of 1995 did not erase ethnic tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Their political system is often deemed the most complicated in the world.

What these agreements achieved instead was the creation of political space---no matter how arduous ----in which overt, ideally, covert violence, in due course, became less useful than negotiation.

The same principle applies today. Hence the world must be patient with the situation with the Strait of Hormuz. Nothing can be solved in 60 days or 90 days let alone 6 or 9 years.

It is what it is.

The reported understanding from the US to "stand down for now" should not be interpreted as evidence that deep differences have disappeared. Iran did not respond to the clarion call.

The disagreements surrounding Iran's nuclear programme, sanctions, ballistic missile capabilities and regional partnerships remain unresolved.

Indeed, upcoming talks may prove more difficult than the military confrontation itself.

Diplomacy requires concessions that domestic audiences often perceive as weakness.

Military action, by contrast, frequently produces immediate political symbolism even when it fails strategically.

This explains why ceasefires often collapse in their early stages.

Political leaders face pressure from hardliners who regard compromise as surrender and moderation as betrayal.

Military commanders operating under uncertainty may overreact to perceived provocations.

Commercial shipping companies, insurance providers and energy markets remain vulnerable to rumours, misinterpretations and isolated incidents.

The Strait of Hormuz therefore remains not merely a geographical chokepoint but a psychological one.

Confidence, once damaged, takes considerably longer to rebuild than infrastructure or military capabilities.

For this reason, future negotiations must focus not only on the nuclear issue but also on communication channels, maritime deconfliction mechanisms and crisis management procedures.

The objective is not simply to prevent war today but to reduce the probability of accidental war tomorrow.

Ultimately, sustainable armistices are not achieved when one side imposes permanent terms upon another.

They endure when antagonists repeatedly adjust their benchmarks of success until coexistence becomes strategically preferable to confrontation.

The current pause in hostilities may therefore represent neither victory nor defeat.

It may simply be the first acknowledgement by both Washington and Tehran that peace requires moving goalposts as much as fixed principles.

In diplomacy, as in war, survival often belongs not to those who refuse to compromise but to those who know precisely which objectives are essential and which can no longer justify continued conflict.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and director, Institute of Internationalisation and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia. 

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.