How Coup-Proofing In Sudan Has Led To 30 Million In Need Of Humanitarian Aid

In 2024 Sudan had 5 billion barrels of oil reserves, placing it on par with other oil-rich states such as Canada (with 4.3 billion) and Mexico (with 5.1 billion). Despite this natural resource abundance, Sudan is facing one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21^st century with the UN reporting that 30 million people are in need of humanitarian aid.

The crisis is caused by an ongoing conflict between the Sudanese army—headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (who is Sudan’s de facto president) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), who also served as al-Burhan’s former deputy during the transition period. Both men helped stage the coup to oust longtime leader Omar al-Bashir in 2019 after ongoing protests. But rather than allow a civilian government to rule, each man jockeyed for control over the Sudanese government and military.

Tensions boiled over the issues of incorporating the 100,000 person RSF into the Sudanese army–and over who would command this unified force. By April 15^th of 2023 shots were fired, igniting the start of the conflict which has generated the displacement of over 13 million people. Though a ceasefire agreement has been accepted by the RSF, the United Nations Human Rights High Commissioner Volker Turk said on Friday that “there is no sign of de-escalation” of the war.

Coup proofing the security sector

Sudan’s transition from authoritarian rule was doomed from the beginning as Bashir left behind a regime that had been coup proofed. As there were 169 coup attempts in Africa from 1950-2010, leaders often take steps to prevent coups from taking place. In Sudan, two of the key strategies to coup proof the regime included supporting the creation of parallel militias and recruiting soldiers along ethnic and tribal lines to ensure loyalty.

In 2013, Bashir formalized the RSF by uniting the loosely organized Janjaweed militias under one command structure. The Janjaweed were Arab-majority militias that were funded by Bashir to repress rebels in Darfur, and were accused of orchestrating an ethnic cleansing campaign. Eventually the RSF became Sudan’s most powerful paramilitary group, and was critical to protecting Bashir from coups and assassination attempts from the regular military- with Bashir referring to Hemedti as “my protector.”

Bashir had already empowered his National Intelligence Security Services (secret police) to become a regularized fighting force by 2008, ensuring a more effective counterweight to the army. Its officers received military ranks, with its top leadership drawing heavily from the riverine tribes.

Supporting parallel militias and other armed units to counterbalance the regular army is a common tactic of dictatorships that (rightly) fear that the military poses the greatest threat to their political survival. Instead of supporting a national army that should be committed to protecting the nation from external threats, tribal militias and presidential guards are established to protect the regime, and the leader from being ousted. These militias are often supplied with better weapons and superior training, making them more confident in their military abilities.

The devolution of violence away from the armed forces of central governments complicates post-authoritarian transitions as there are multiple armed groups, often with a strong tribal, ethnic or sectarian identities (purposely cultivated by the former leader) that refuse to lay down their arms and give up power. Research has shown that paramilitary groups that are ethnically homogenous are more capable and willing to use repression. Homogeneity simplifies coordination and communication and amplifies the perception of an external threat.

In the aftermath of ousting a coup-proofed regime, conflict and chaos have often followed, such as in Iraq where Saddam Hussein supported the powerful Fedayeen paramilitaries and cultivated tribal networks; in Libya, where Muammar Gaddafi propped up numerous tribal militias, with the 32^nd Brigade (which was commanded by one of Gaddafi’s sons) being the best equipped and well trained; and in Yemen, where former President Ali Abdullah Saleh boasted of having half a million tribesmen who on his command could mobilize their own guns and ammunition. In all three cases, the presence of numerous paramilitaries and other armed groups made it near impossible to achieve stability, post authoritarian breakdown.

These forces are often undisciplined—trained only in violence but not bound by formal codes of respecting human rights. As such they may be more likely to engage in genocide and other crimes against humanity.

Catastrophe in Sudan

As al-Burhan and Hemedti’s forces were unable to merge, the RSF resumed attacks on civilians in Darfur in 2023; this is in addition to the carnage caused by the Janjaweed militias in the 2000s in Darfur which left at least 300,000 people dead. Though both the army and the RSF have engaged in violence and have been accused of committing war crimes, the RSF has been emboldened by the absence of accountability.

Civilians have paid the price—as some 150,000 to upwards of 400,000 have been killed in the two years since the fighting started. Just last month reportedly 2,000 people in the town of el-Fasher were massacred by the RSF. The BBC reported that one RSF soldier claimed that “our job is only killing.”

The fighting has also led to economic collapse, and spiralling food and fuel prices. The UN has reported that this has led to a hunger crisis, with over half the population facing acute food insecurity and some of the population facing famine conditions.

Just two weeks after the RSF took over the famine-stricken city of al-Fasher, the RSF agreed to a humanitarian ceasefire proposed by the Quad (the US, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) on November 6^th. But these ceasefire proposals have been agreed to by both the RSF and Sudanese army in the past with little success.

Though legitimized by the international community early on in the transition, both al-Burhan and Hemedti have repeatedly made commitments to only break them. Rather than sanctioning both leaders, the West assumed that al-Burhan and Hemedti were reputable political players.

To truly establish a long-term cessation of hostilities, these various paramilitary groups that were established under Bashir’s tenure need to be completely disarmed and demobilized. Otherwise any prospective peace deal has no chance of being successful in the long run.