Justin Bons Sounds Alarm: Bitcoin Faces ‘Death Spiral’ in 7-11 Years

Declining miner rewards and governance limits may leave Bitcoin vulnerable to attacks and congestion within the next 7–11 years.

A new analysis from Justin Bons argues that Bitcoin could face a systemic breakdown within the next decade. The warning centers on a shrinking security budget, limited transaction capacity, and governance rigidity. According to the analysis, these forces could combine to trigger attacks, congestion, and a loss of confidence in the network that it may not withstand.

Report Raises Concerns Over Bitcoin’s Ability to Sustain Security After Future Halvings

In his review, Bons pointed to mining economics. Each halving reduces the block subsidy, lowering miner revenue unless Bitcoin’s price or transaction fees increase significantly. He argues that the level of price growth required to offset these cuts would exceed global economic output within a few decades.

Sustained high transaction fees conflict with user behavior, as activity typically falls when costs rise. As a result, miner revenue trends lower in real terms, weakening the economic cost of attacking the chain.

Security, the analysis stresses, should be measured by miner revenue, rather than raw hash rate. Hardware efficiency can rise while attack costs fall. What matters is the money paid to miners, since attackers weigh cost against potential gains. With revenue shrinking, that balance shifts.

Image Source: Justin Bons

Key pressure points identified in the analysis include:

• Halvings steadily cut inflation-funded security.
• Fee markets fail to hold extreme levels for long.
• Miner revenue declines even as hash rate grows.
• Attack costs fall relative to potential rewards.
• Network value rises faster than its security budget.

Attack scenarios focus on double-spend attempts against exchanges. An attacker controlling a majority of mining power could send coins to exchanges, trade them, withdraw proceeds, then reorganize the chain to reclaim the original coins. 

By targeting multiple venues simultaneously, an attacker could extract hundreds of millions of dollars. Bons estimates that within the next 7–11 years, the cost of sustaining a one-day attack could fall below $3 million. And this figure would be far less than the potential returns. Under those conditions, such attacks could also become attractive to state-level actors.

Bitcoin’s Seven-TPS Limit Seen as Structural Risk During Market Stress

Bitcoin’s on-chain capacity remains around seven transactions per second. Under conservative assumptions, if all current holders attempted a single transaction, the queue would stretch to nearly two months. 

Global adoption would push that delay into decades. During congestion, many transactions would stall or drop, creating conditions similar to a bank run without banks.

Panic could then feed back into price. A sharp drop would force miners offline, slowing block production until difficulty adjusts. Slower blocks further reduce capacity, extending backlogs and adding stress. The analysis describes a self-reinforcing cycle in which falling prices, declining security, and network slowdowns worsen each other.

Governance-wise, Bons argues that development control rests with Bitcoin Core, which acts as a gatekeeper for protocol changes. Past conflicts during the block size debates ended with limited capacity locked in, while alternative approaches lost influence. That history, the analysis suggests, makes timely fixes unlikely.

Analysis Warns BTC Could Fracture Over Inflation as Security Costs Rise

Some developers have acknowledged the dilemma. Peter Todd and others have discussed the idea of raising inflation to fund security. Yet such a move would break Bitcoin’s fixed-supply promise, splitting the network between supporters and opponents. Chain splits would divide hash power, leaving each version weaker.

According to the analysis, Bitcoin could soon face stark choices:

• Raise inflation above the 21 million cap.
• Accept rising risks of censorship and double-spend attacks.
• Endure prolonged congestion during stress events.
• See trust erode as promises collide with reality.
• Risk chain splits that reduce overall security.

The critique also challenges the idea of Bitcoin as a reliable store of value without broad utility. Limited throughput prevents it from supporting payments at scale, pushing most users toward custodians. That reliance undercuts self-custody, one of Bitcoin’s founding goals, and raises exit risks during market stress.

Bons contrasts the current design with the early vision outlined by Satoshi Nakamoto, who expected on-chain scaling to support global use. By capping capacity, the analysis argues, Bitcoin traded practical use for scarcity, leaving security dependent on assumptions that may not hold.

Without structural changes, Bitcoin’s security funding is set to decline while the economic incentives for attacks increase. Governance barriers continue to limit the scope for meaningful reform.

As such, this raises the risk that any response will come only after serious damage has occurred. According to Bons, the next decade will determine whether Bitcoin can adapt to these pressures or face severe consequences due to its current design.