“US will drive its $35T debt into crypto”, Kremlin warns — reset or propaganda?

Is the US preparing a debt escape plan hidden as Putin’s adviser suggests — one that could devalue trillions and force the world to adjust?

Kobyakov’s debt reset accusation

During the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok on Sep. 6, Anton Kobyakov, senior adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, gave a sharp view on how the U.S. may be attempting to manage its $35 trillion national debt.

He claimed that Washington is exploring a strategy to transfer part of its liabilities into cryptocurrencies, specifically stablecoins, which he described as a kind of “crypto cloud.”

In his view, such a move could allow the U.S. to devalue its obligations and trigger a rapid financial reset, once again pushing economic risk outward onto the global system.

Kobyakov presented gold and digital currencies as increasingly viable alternatives to traditional government-backed money. He argued that these instruments could be used to ease domestic fiscal strain while reshaping the global financial order.

To back his claim, he pointed to earlier turning points in American monetary history, including the 1930s abandonment of the gold standard and the 1971 exit from the Bretton Woods agreement.

Both episodes, he said, reshaped global monetary dynamics and shifted the costs of adjustment onto other nations. He also suggested that a similar transition today could unfold within 3 to 5 years.

Let’s try to understand what may be occurring behind the scenes and examine whether these claims stand up to the current realities of global finance.

How the U.S. used rule changes to manage its debt

Historical records show that the U.S. has, at key moments, altered its monetary system in ways that allowed it to manage debt pressures without defaulting in formal terms.

While domestic reasons such as deflation, reserve imbalances, or inflation control were cited as triggers, the outcomes frequently involved global ripple effects that supported U.S. solvency at the expense of creditors.

The first instance unfolded between 1933 and 1934 during the Great Depression. Faced with plunging prices and widespread bank failures, the Roosevelt administration moved quickly to break the dollar’s link to gold.

Laws were passed to seize gold holdings, nullify gold-payment clauses in both public and private contracts, and revalue gold from $20.67 to $35 per ounce.

That change alone created nearly $2.8 billion in paper profits, which seeded the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund, a vehicle used to influence currency markets with minimal Congressional oversight.

These measures not only lifted domestic prices but also reduced the real weight of dollar-denominated debt, in part because contracts once tied to fixed gold weights were now settled in paper currency that had already declined in real terms.

The Supreme Court upheld these changes in 1935, effectively insulating the U.S. from legal challenges to the re-denomination of obligations.

Nearly four decades later, a second transformation took place. The Bretton Woods system had anchored the global monetary order since the 1940s, with the dollar convertible to gold at a fixed rate of $35 per ounce.

But in the 1960s, rising external liabilities and insufficient U.S. gold reserves created doubts about that commitment. Stopgap measures such as the London Gold Pool and the introduction of IMF Special Drawing Rights delayed but did not resolve the imbalance.

In 1971, President Nixon suspended gold convertibility for foreign governments and imposed domestic price controls. The move unilaterally ended the dollar’s gold backing and forced the rest of the world to absorb a floating fiat regime.

In 1973, global currencies were no longer anchored to gold, and the dollar’s value was now shaped by market forces rather than metal parity.

These two episodes are widely studied for their effects on debt dynamics. After each shift, U.S. inflation accelerated. In the 1970s, consumer prices rose more than 13% annually at their peak while interest rates often lagged behind, resulting in negative real returns.

That meant creditors holding fixed-rate claims, whether pension funds, savers, or foreign central banks, saw the real value of those assets shrink. In economic terms, the government reduced its debt burden through inflation and currency devaluation without missing a payment.

Viewed from this perspective, Kobyakov’s argument is not without precedent. In both cases, the 1930s and early 1970s, the U.S. changed core monetary rules in response to internal pressures while the financial cost of adjustment was partially absorbed by external creditors.

That distinction forms the basis of what critics have long described as an asymmetry embedded in the dollar system.

The phrase “exorbitant privilege,” coined in the 1960s by French finance minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, captured this frustration by pointing to the ability of the U.S. to borrow in its own currency, rewrite rules when necessary, and leave others to adjust.

GENIUS Act formalizes the crypto–debt connection

In July, President Donald Trump signed the GENIUS Act, creating a federal framework for payment stablecoins and opening a new chapter in how crypto finance connects with government debt. Sovereign debt refers to the money the U.S. borrows through bonds and Treasuries.

The law sets strict requirements for issuers. Stablecoins must be backed fully by cash or short-term U.S. Treasuries; issuers must publish monthly reserve disclosures, follow anti-money laundering rules, and obtain direct federal licenses.

Its passage comes at a time when stablecoin reserves are already becoming intertwined with the U.S. public debt market.

Leading issuers such as Tether and Circle back their tokens with short-dated government securities and repo instruments. Repo instruments are short-term loans secured by Treasuries. That practice creates a direct link between crypto platforms and government funding.

As of Sep. 9, the combined supply of stablecoins stands near $300 billion. Tether (USDT) accounts for roughly $169 billion, while USD Coin (USDC) is close to $72 billion.

The figure remains small compared to the $35 trillion national debt, yet the reserves behind these tokens represent a steady source of demand for Treasury bills. Crypto platforms are now tied into the short-term borrowing system Washington relies on to keep its financing running.

Concentration risk adds another layer. Tether’s most recent attestation showed holdings of more than $127 billion in Treasuries, an amount comparable to a mid-size sovereign nation’s creditor position.

Tether is based offshore and serves a global user base, so its inflows and redemptions follow international market conditions rather than U.S. domestic cycles. Sudden changes in activity can shift demand for Treasury bills and ripple into the broader market’s liquidity.

The connection matters because stablecoin reserves do not reduce federal liabilities, but they influence how those liabilities are financed.

Continuous demand for Treasury bills helps anchor the short end of the yield curve, pushing yields lower and reducing government borrowing costs.

When inflation runs above those yields, the real value of debt shrinks over time. The burden is not eliminated but instead transferred onto global holders of tokenized cash, ranging from everyday users to large institutions in crypto markets.

The pattern recalls earlier U.S. moves that reshaped debt repayment terms without outright default. Whether deliberate or emergent, the stablecoin structure now makes it possible to ease the real weight of federal debt while leaving existing contracts formally intact.

The “crypto cloud” doesn’t erase debt

The issue raised by Kobyakov is not whether the U.S. can erase $35 trillion in liabilities through stablecoins. The more pressing question is whether the global financial system can withstand another shift in U.S. monetary rules without breaking trust in the dollar.

The dollar has anchored international finance since the mid-20th century, and its importance was never only about convertibility or trade. It was also about consistency.

After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the dollar remained dominant. Its share of global reserves peaked around 85% and still stands near 58 to 59% today, according to IMF data.

That share is no longer fixed. Central banks have been steadily diversifying their reserves. IMF reports show more allocations to the euro, gold, and smaller currency baskets that include the Chinese yuan.

The World Gold Council reported record levels of official gold buying in 2023 and 2024. Central banks in China, Turkey, and India added hundreds of tonnes combined, pushing gold’s share of global reserves closer to 24%.

Alternative systems are also growing. China and Russia have expanded cross-border settlement in local currencies. Trials of China’s digital yuan have processed billions in volume, and Russia’s central bank is running pilot programs for a digital ruble.

That environment makes U.S. stablecoin legislation more complicated in its effects. On one hand, the GENIUS Act and the participation of large asset managers in tokenized funds expand the reach of the dollar into digital finance.

On the other hand, the structure brings more users and institutions into a system where U.S. policy choices directly shape their returns.

That broader participation changes how risk is spread. In the past, monetary shifts were absorbed mainly by foreign governments or large institutional creditors. The stablecoin era creates a much wider base.

The concept of a “crypto cloud” does not remove debt from view. It spreads the consequences across a larger pool of holders, many of whom may not realize the part they play in carrying that burden.