The current focus of attention in the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) flood control projects scandal is the investigation and filing of charges against government officials (including legislators) and contractors implicated in the case. Thorough investigation and judicious prosecution of those involved in the anomalous flood control and related projects should indeed be pursued at this stage.

But lest what is now reputed to be the biggest scandal to hit the Philippines just goes the way of many previous corruption scandals in which all or most of the “big fish” have remained scot-free — such as in the P728-million fertilizer fund scam (2004) and the P10 billion pork barrel scam (2013) — we should examine the patterns that have emerged from the various scandals and draw lessons from them. And we should keep close track of the entire process that the DPWH scandal will undergo.

Outrage and vigilance tend to wane or even completely dissipate as the process of a corruption case drags on through years of litigation.  

Corruption usually proceeds in a linear fashion in the sense that many corrupt politicians and bureaucrats succeed in conducting their clandestine predation undisturbed and unexposed and making everything seem normal. Since predators tend to grow greedier over time, the line can be drawn as becoming more and more crooked and in an ascending trajectory. 

Sometimes, however, corruption is uncovered and exposed, and a scandal arises. The corruption is disrupted. The corruption scandal undergoes a cycle, which could be short or long. It ends with a return to corruption by one or more of the corrupt officials — not just those convicted but also those who escaped conviction. (It must be noted here that many of the country’s grand corruption scandals have ended with no big fish, or even no single person, being put behind bars.) For corrupt officials, it is back to linear corruption.  This could again be disrupted with an exposé of a new corruption case implicating one or more of the corrupt officials involved in the earlier scandal. A new cycle then begins.  

The stages of a long corruption scandal cycle are:

1. Uncovering and/or exposé
2. Investigation
3. Indictment and Prosecution
4. Punishment or Acquittal
5. Non-implementation/Reversal of Punishment or Pardon
6. “Rehabilitation” and Relegitimation
7. “Return to Normal”  

In the first three stages of the cycle, no one has yet been established as being guilty of corruption.

The resignation of an implicated public official may at times transpire within these first three stages. “Return to Normal” could mean resumption or reversion to honest public service of those earlier implicated in the corruption scandal, but it could also mean the return to predatory activity by one or more of the corrupt officials involved in the scandal, whether convicted or not.

The new stage

If corrupt officials, especially the big fish, do not succeed in getting away at one stage, then they try to get away at the next stage. Many Filipinos think that justice has triumphed when a corrupt official is convicted and meted the appropriate punishment. But sometime later, when many do not follow the case anymore, the verdict could be reversed or not implemented, or the official is pardoned. Corrupt officials — convicted or not — run again for public office or secure a reappointment to “rehabilitate” and relegitimize themselves.  

Shorter cycles involve the skipping of certain stages. The shortest cycle would be a jump from Uncovering/Exposé (Stage 1) to “Return to Normal” (Stage 7), which simply means that the exposé has been a dud. Corrupt politicians try to keep the cycle as short as possible, as a long cycle could entail spending years in prison or in judicial appeals. 

Changes in government and changes in the country’s top anti-corruption agency, the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), have a great bearing in the development of a corruption scandal cycle. A corrupt or inept president or ombudsman cannot be expected to be enthusiastic nor serious in fighting corruption. Some presidents and ombudsmen have come under the cloud. Former president Joseph Estrada, implicated in a bribery scandal (Juetengate), was ousted by a popular uprising and was later convicted of plunder. Former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was rated as the most corrupt Philippine leader in history in a 2007 Asian Pulse survey, beating out even Ferdinand Marcos, Sr., and Estrada. She was indicted for plunder in 2012, but acquitted by the Supreme Court in 2016.

Former ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez was impeached by the House of Representatives in 2011 for, among other reasons, failing to act on several corruption allegations made against Arroyo, her husband and associates. Gutierrez resigned before the Senate impeachment trial could begin. Ombudsman Samuel Martires demonstrated the depths of his ineptitude when he confessed, in congressional hearings, that “corruption has become a fashion, a fad … [and] is growing in every agency of the government” and that “we are fighting corruption right within the [Ombudsman’s] office.” 

When the going gets rough for a corrupt politician in the course of a corruption scandal cycle, he or she may actually choose to let the process drag until a new President or Ombudsman comes along, hoping that the latter is more pliable, corruptible or inept, or comes from the same political party or faction.

How post-EDSA I governments handled corruption during the authoritarian era is quite indicative of how effective anti-corruption efforts have been. During the martial law period, there was rampant corruption by President Marcos, his wife, Imelda, and his cronies. Among Marcos’ top cronies, as named by Wikipedia, were: Juan Ponce Enrile, Antonio Floirendo, Danding Cojuangco, Roberto Benedicto, Lucio Tan, Geronimo Velasco, Roman Cruz, Rodolfo Cuenca, Manuel Elizalde, Ricardo Silverio, Herminio Disini, Pete Sabido and Jose Yao Campos. Although the the first couple and Marcos’ cronies have undergone post-EDSA cycles of corruption, none of them has been tried and convicted of plunder or corruption. The lone exception is Imelda Marcos, who was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of corruption-related charges, but she has not spent a single day behind bars. The Sandiganbayan has convicted only a few of Marcos’ minor “cronies” on graft, such as three former officials of Integrated Shoe Inc.

The Philippines’ major corruption scandals in the post-authoritarian period have terminated at various stages, before “Return to Normal” (RN). The shortest-cycle scandals were the Offshore Wealth cases (Offshore Leaks, Panama Papers, Pandora Papers), which never fared beyond Stage 1 (Exposé) before RN. The second shortest-cycle scandals, reaching only Stage 2 (Investigation) were the PEA-Amari and the Ilocos Tobacco Tax Funds scandals. The Philhealth scandal remains largely stuck at the moment at Stage 2, the UC-Malampaya and Pharmally scandals, at Stage 3 (Prosecution).

The Sara Duterte impeachment case has gone back to Stage 2. With the release of retired major general Carlos Garcia after 17 years in prison, the Garcia “plunder” case may have ended at Stage 4 (Punishment) before RN, but his wife and three sons still face plunder charges. After years of investigation and litigation, the NBN-ZTE, Euro generals, military “pabaon,” and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office fund scandals concluded in Stage 4 (Punishment or Acquittal) before RN with either no one or no big fish being convicted of corruption.

The fertilizer fund scandal appears to have reached a similar dead end too. The first  Malampaya Fund scandal, did end in convictions for a provincial governor and several others. With the reversal of the dismissal of some Immigration officials, the Pastilyas bribery scam has moved to Stage 5 (Reversal). The ghost road projects ended at Stage 5 (Pardon) before RN. Juetengate and the PDAF Pork Barrel scam were long-cycle scandals, attaining Stage 6 (Read: The politics of rehabilitation and relegitimation) with the return to public office of former President Estrada and many of those indicted in the PDAF scam. 

Below are diagrams and a brief explanation of the cycles of a corruption scandal. They show how, through the stages, the numbers of officials being investigated or prosecuted for corruption are whittled down (sometimes to zero) and how those somewhat tainted “rehabilitate” or relegitimate themselves. Short, medium and long cycles all end with 1.7 (or 2.0) “Return to Normal. End of Cycle” (RN/EC).  2.1 (not shown on the diagram) would mean the uncovering or exposé of a new scandal involving an official or officials implicated in 1.1.

1.0 Everything Seems Normal. Public officials with integrity engage in genuine public service. Corrupt officials engage in clandestine predation – linear corruption. Some persons not involved may be suspicious or even in the know, but they keep quiet, and the corrupt activity remains hidden to the public.  

1.1 Uncovering and/or exposé. This marks the beginning of the cycle of a corruption scandal and often suspends or stops an ongoing corrupt activity. Corrupt officials strive to prevent the scandal from moving on to the next stage by issuing denials or explanations, or attacking their accusers.

Many cases of plausible corruption are of the “flash in the pan” type – they do not go beyond uncovering/exposé. Examples are the cases of offshore wealth exposed in the Offshore Leaks, Panama Papers, and Pandora Papers.

1.2 Investigation. Conducted by the OMB, congressional committees or special commissions, sometimes with public hearings, investigation puts public officials suspected of having engaged in corruption in the center of intense media attention and public scrutiny. Grand corruption often involves multiple players with at least some of them being high-ranked public officials.

At the investigation stage, implicated officials make every effort to avoid being indicted, especially on the charge of plunder. Plunder, which is non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, could mean immediate detention. Worse, an official found guilty of plunder gets life imprisonment.

The investigation stage sometimes ends up with only a few or no one or no big fish being formally charged, as in the PEA-Amari and Ilocos Norte Tobacco Excise Tax scandals, and probably the Philhealth scandal too. 

1.3 Indictment and prosecution. At this stage, one thing to watch out for here is whether there are some names, especially those of top officials, that do not appear on the lists of those 1) indicted, and 2) indicted for more serious charges, such as plunder. Corrupt officials manage to avoid being on either list through the brilliance of their lawyers, the incompetence or lack of diligence of the prosecution and/or the contamination in the judicial system. Those who do stand trial seek to make it as quick as possible, not just because they do not want to get out of the glare of public opprobrium, but also because they also want to get back to the good old days. Long trials sometimes work in the corrupt officials’ favor as public attention and pressure wane over time. During the prosecution stage, those accused of serious crimes such as plunder sometimes engage in plea-bargaining, such as in the Garcia “Plunder” case, in order to face charges on lesser offenses.

In the case of certain high-level government posts, impeachment serves as a form of indictment and this has had some curious denouements in the Philippines: popular uprising (Joseph Estrada) and unconstitutionality ruling (Sara Duterte).  

1.4 Punishment or acquittal. Perhaps the most striking feature of scandals that end at this stage is that many grand corruption cases end with either no conviction at all (NBN-ZTE, Euro Generals, AFP Pabaon and PCSO Fund scandals) or no conviction of ringleaders (Fertilizer Fund scandal). Many of those charged, especially the most prominent figures are often acquitted because of “insufficiency of evidence” and “inordinate delay” in the cases filed against them. Years of litigation often help in diminishing public attention and recollection.

Punishment for corruption ranges from administrative sanction (such as suspension or dismissal from one’s government position), to light prison sentence to life imprisonment. In spite of all the grand corruption scandals that have come to pass over the past few decades, a total of only four people have actually been convicted of plunder: Estrada (Juetengate), Janet Lim-Napoles and Richard Cambe (PDAF), and a Bureau of Internal Revenue cashier. This is a damning testimony to the inefficacy of the OMB and other anti-corruption bodies. 

1.5 Non-implementation/reversal of punishment or pardon. Many Filipinos think that justice has been realized with the conviction or administration sanction of corrupt officials. But there are still a number of ways to circumvent or reduce punishment: non-implementation or reversal, as in the cases of Imelda Marcos and Senator Villanueva, and presidential pardons as in the cases of former President Estrada and Jaime Ponce de Leon. The power of executive clemency of the President includes commutation of sentence, conditional pardon or absolute pardon. Parole, not necessarily for good behavior, is another avenue, but the media does not usually keep track of this.  

1.6 ‘Rehabilitation’ and relegitimation. Rehabilitation refers to efforts of a public official who has been implicated or tainted in a corruption scandal to regain public acceptability, respectability and credibility. Relegitimation consists of efforts at regaining the trust of voters or the general public. For honest public officials who have been wrongly implicated, and for once-corrupt officials who wish to change for the better, rehabilitation and relegitimation are necessary for them to be able to resume, or revert to, genuine public service without hindrances or inhibitions. As can be gleaned or suspected from the frequent repetition of names in corruption scandals, however, incorrigibly corrupt public officials are actually using “rehabilitation” and relegitimation as instruments for the resumption or continuation of predation. 

Among those who have been implicated in plunder or corruption scandals before, the list of public officials who have been most proficient in relegitimation would include former Presidents Estrada and Arroyo, Senators Lapid, Jinggoy Estrada, Imee Marcos and Villanueva, and former Senator Enrile.

1.7/2.0 Return to normal. End of cycle (RN/EC). Everything appears normal again. It would be difficult for the general public to size up who among the public officials implicated or convicted in corruption scandals are, or have turned into, honest public servants, and who are or have remained corrupt. Sometimes, however, the name of a public official previously implicated crops up again in a new corruption scandal. The official becomes part of new cycle. 

Somecorrupt former officials, such as Imelda Marcos, choose to “retire” and just wallow in the luxury of their ill-gotten wealth. (Although her sentence bars her from returning to public office, she could still have very well made a Joseph Estrada-style comeback had she wished.) Still other corrupt officials impart their predatory knowhow to their sons, daughters or other relatives,  ensuring the handing on of the baton of the venerable dynastic tradition called corruption. The fact that certain surnames or middle names come up in scandal after scandal are indicative of some bequeathal processes at work.

Proceed in cycles

Corruption scandals proceed in cycles, some going through just one stage (Uncovering/Exposé), others through as many as six stages, before things “return to normal.” Corrupt public officials, especially the big fish, try to keep the cycle of a corruption scandal as short as possible. Through Stages 1 to 5, they try to get away from any accountability, any investigation, any charge, any punishment. If they cannot get away at one stage, they try again at the next stage. If the penalty being considered is much too severe, such as life imprisonment (for plunder), they try to bring it down to a lesser crime or to nothing, through connections, plea bargaining, bribery, whatever works.

Corrupt officials undergoing judicial processes resort to case-dragging, however, if they deem that the President or the Ombudsman is truly coming down hard on them. They do not merely wait for “better” times; they also lay their bets on possible successors who are more pliable or are kindred spirits.  

For incorrigibly corrupt public officials, Stage 6 (“Rehabilitation” and Relegitimation) is the most important stage. If a corrupt official succeeds in being elected or appointed to public office again, he or she gets access again to all the opportunities for rent creation, extraction and sharing with corrupt businessmen and contractors and his/her political dynasty. Millions, billions, trillions of pesos!

The experience of Joseph Estrada is perhaps the most instructive of all. A public official charged with plunder can go through all the stages — uncovering/exposé, investigation, indictment and prosecution, conviction, pardon, rehabilitation and relegitimation — and his son ends up convicted of bribery. If a politician convicted of plunder can still get back to public office, why cannot other public officials charged with the usual or lesser corruption charges follow in his footsteps?

The DPWH scam is currently transitioning from Stage 2 to Stage 3 with the start of indictments against some public officials and private contractors. Trials of those charged may start, possibly in a few months. What the anti-corruption movement should watch out for, however, is 1) that the big fish, or some big fish,  may escape indictment or conviction in Stages 3 and 4; 2) that the big fish, or some big fish, may escape indictment or conviction for plunder, post bail early on, and even leave the country; and 3) that the corruption scandal cycle moves on to Stages 5 and 6 and to the resumption of corrupt activity in Stage 7 (Return to normal). 

Vigilance, determination, and doggedness are imperative at all stages of the cycle of a corruption scandal if the anti-corruption movement wants to make sure that corrupt political officials, especially the big fish, do not get away … and get back into the game. – Rappler.com

Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, who has retired from teaching political science and international relations at the University of Tsukuba, Japan, taught an online course on “Corruption” at the Ateneo de Manila University last year and earlier this year. He is now based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.