The Open Banking Hijack: Millions of Illegal Casino Deposits Through Anonymous Payment Gateways

Our latest Stellar-casino reviews (WinBay, AllySpin, LuckyMax, Spinbara and related “domain mutations”) show a familiar pattern: unlicensed casino access + rail obfuscation. Players are routed through anonymous open-banking checkout domains and “gateway cascades,” while “fake bank deposits” appear to be executed via crypto purchases routed through ChainValley and other on/off-ramp infrastructure. Traffic intelligence suggests the system is heavily Germany-skewed, with mainstream banks repeatedly appearing in the journey.

I. Payment Infrastructure as Crime Facilitator

Open banking was designed to revolutionize European payments through transparency, security, and consumer empowerment. Account-to-account transfers authenticated via bank-grade biometrics, instant settlement, and financial data sharing for KYC verification promised to create safer, more efficient payment ecosystems.

What FinTelegram has documented is the systematic perversion of this infrastructure.

FinTelegram identified three payment gateways—operating with domain carousel without disclosed beneficial ownership, regulatory oversight, or transparent corporate structures—have hijacked open banking rails to process what traffic intelligence suggests are well over one million casino deposit transactions monthly, predominantly from German players to operators holding no German gambling licenses.

The operational architecture is elegant in its deception:

• Players see: “Bank Transfer,” “Instant Banking,” or “Sofortüberweisung” options in casino cashiers—familiar, trusted payment methods.
• Banks process: Generic account-to-account transfers to entities presenting as financial technology providers or payment processors, not gambling merchants.
• Regulators encounter: Payment flows categorized as “financial services” or “technology services,” evading gambling-specific Merchant Category Codes (MCCs) and payment blocking orders.
• Casino operators receive: Instant settlement of player deposits without traditional payment processor oversight, chargeback risk, or meaningful AML scrutiny.

The result is a parallel payment infrastructure that systematically undermines three years of German enforcement efforts under the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2021, Dutch KSA payment blocking initiatives, and Italian ADM concession requirements—while leveraging the trust and security of European banks to facilitate illegal activity at industrial scale.

II. The Anonymized Gateway Network: TransactGrid, PayByBank, & BankLayer

Our analysis reveals a highly centralized “Gateway Stack” designed for obfuscation.

• TransactGrid (checkout.transactgrid.com): The core “Black Rail” of the operation. With 760,000+ monthly visits, it serves as the final settlement point for multiple referring sites.
• PayByBank (openbanking.paybybank.net): A specialized “feeder” gateway. Our data shows 100% of its destination traffic is funneled directly into TransactGrid. This indicates that PayByBank acts as a “white-label” front to provide a veneer of legitimacy to the underlying TransactGrid infrastructure.
• BankLayer (checkout.banklayer.org): Focused almost exclusively on the Stellar Group (Frumzi, Allyspin, Supabet). This gateway serves as a dedicated rail for Stellar’s “mutated” domains—disposable URLs (e.g., frumzi756723.com) used to evade ISP blocks.

Target Market Analysis

Despite holding only an Anjouan license—which explicitly does not authorize service to German, Dutch, or Italian players—Stellar casinos generate 92%+ of their open banking traffic from Germany. This geographic concentration, combined with German-language interfaces, Euro as primary currency, and integration with German banking infrastructure (Postbank, Sparkasse branding in payment flows), demonstrates active and deliberate targeting of German players in direct violation of the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2021.

Aggregate Traffic Analysis: The Scale of Illegal Deposit Infrastructure

Interpretation Framework

The 4-8 minute average visit duration is a critical data point. Open banking payment flows require:

1. Gateway landing and bank selection (30-60 seconds)
2. Redirect to bank authentication portal (10-20 seconds)
3. Bank credential entry and 2FA/biometric authentication (1-3 minutes)
4. Payment consent review and authorization (30-60 seconds)
5. Return redirect to merchant and deposit confirmation (30-60 seconds)

Total expected duration for completed transactions: 4-7 minutes.

The observed 4-8 minute average strongly suggests that the vast majority of these 1.2+ million visits represent completed or attempted payment transactions, not casual browsing or abandoned flows. Combined with the exclusive casino referral sources and 95%+ German traffic concentration, the evidence supports the conclusion that these gateways processed approximately 1.2 million illegal casino deposit transactions from German, Dutch, and Italian players in December 2025 alone.​

Annualized estimate: 14+ million transactions processed through anonymous open banking gateways to unlicensed offshore casinos.

III. The “Fake Fiat” Bridge: ChainValley & The VASP Exploit

Some casinos, like Spinbara (Spinbara1.com) utilize (additionally) a more deceptive technique known as “Crypto-on-Ramp Laundering” via the Polish VASP ChainValley (app.chainvalley.pro).

• The Deception: Players are prompted to make a “bank deposit.” In reality, they are redirected to ChainValley to purchase USDT or BTC, which is instantly transferred to the casino.
• Regulatory Loophole: ChainValley exploits the Polish VASP Registry, which has been criticized by European regulators for its low barrier to entry. By operating under a “Virtual Asset” license, they process fiat-to-crypto flows that the player believes are simple fiat deposits.
• Volume: Over 217,000 visits in December 2025. The 5-minute average stay duration strongly correlates with the time required to complete a 3D-Secure bank transfer and a crypto-on-ramp purchase.

IV. The utPay Shutdown: A MiCA Success Story?

As previously reported, utPay (app.utpay.io) was a major player in this ecosystem, handling 610,000 visits in December. The suspension of their crypto services in January 2026, citing MiCA (Regulation EU 2023/1114), is a significant event.

Analysis: It is highly probable that the Bank of Lithuania intervened after identifying utPay’s role as a facilitator for high-risk gambling. Under MiCA, VASPs face significantly higher scrutiny regarding their “Merchant Base.” A provider whose traffic is 80% gambling-related (as our data suggests) would likely fail the “fit and proper” test required for a MiCA-compliant CASP license.

V. Compliance Assessment & Red Flags

This multi-layered architecture is designed to bypass the “Gambling Merchant Category Code” (MCC 7995). By using Open Banking:

1. Merchant Identity is Hidden: The bank sees a transfer to “TransactGrid” or “ChainValley,” not “WinBay Casino.”
2. No Chargeback Protection: Unlike card payments, bank-to-bank transfers via these gateways offer players zero protection, making them the preferred method for predatory offshore operators.

Call to Action for Players & Insiders

FinTelegram is actively mapping the bank accounts used by TransactGrid, BankLayer, and ChainValley.

• Have you made a deposit to these sites? Check your bank statement. What was the name of the recipient?
• Insiders: Do you have information on the beneficial owners of the TransactGrid or PayByBank domains?

Submit your evidence anonymously via Whistle42.com. Help us protect the European financial system from shadow banking.