THE SKRILL ADMISSION: Payment Giant Confirms Shell Merchants Briantie and Cyperion as “Official Partners” Amidst Massive Identity Theft Scandal

In an explosive response to a victim’s complaint, payment giant Skrill has officially confirmed that documented shell companies Briantie Limited and Cyperion Solutions Limited are “on-boarded merchants” who passed its internal checks. While admitting it debited the victim’s bank account for 28 fraudulent transactions, Skrill denies all liability, claiming no “contractual agreement” exists with the payers using its gateway.

The Skrill Gateway to Transaction Laundering

Skrill’s formal response to the player’s complaint acts as a “smoking gun” for regulators. By refusing to reverse the disputed transactions while simultaneously confirming the status of the predatory merchants, Skrill has exposed a systemic vulnerability in the European payment landscape.

1. Official Confirmation of the Shell Network

Skrill has confirmed that Cyperion Solutions Limited and Briantie Limited—entities identified in our investigation as financial shells for the Galaktika N.V. / SoftSwiss ecosystem—are official Skrill merchants. Skrill explicitly listed 28 specific transactions between December 2025 and January 2026 that were routed to these entities through its “Quick Checkout” gateway.

Skrill’s email is very revealing and, despite rejecting the complaint, provides several strong angles for escalation.

• All disputed payments are “gateway payments” via Skrill Quick Checkout where Skrill acts only for the merchant, not for the payer; therefore they do not show in the user’s Skrill wallet history.
• The disputed transactions were processed for two Skrill merchants – Cyperion Solutions Limited and Briantie Limited – plus their “subsidiary companies, license holders or payment processors”.
• Skrill explicitly classifies Cyperion Solutions Limited and Briantie Limited as approved merchants that “have passed all relevant checks” and states it is “satisfied” with the business relationship.
• Skrill acknowledges the customer’s allegations of transaction laundering and illegal gambling, yet still declines to uphold the complaint and pushes responsibility to merchants and authorities.
• Skrill permanently closed the user’s wallet account and claims to have taken steps to prevent further use of his data, implicitly acknowledging the identity‑theft risk.

Read our Shadow Skrill reports here.

2. The “No Contract” Loophole

Skrill’s primary defense is a technicality: it claims that for “gateway payments,” it offers services only to the merchant and has no contractual agreement with the payer. This allows Skrill to:

• Debit a victim’s bank account (appearing as SKR*Skrill.com).
• Transmit those funds to offshore-linked shells.
• Wash its hands of the “quality, safety, or legality” of the services provided.
• This confirms our findings that the “Shadow Skrill” phenomenon is a deliberate feature of their “Quick Checkout” architecture, used by illegal operators to mask the final destination of funds.

This is how Skrill frames its responsibility:

• They rely on a strict distinction between:
  • Wallet payments (user–Skrill contractual relationship), and
  • Gateway/Quick Checkout payments (merchant–Skrill only, payer is not their customer).
• On that basis, Skrill argues:
  • It is merely providing a “technical environment”,
  • It does not vouch for legality of underlying services, and
  • All disputes should be directed at the merchants, not Skrill.
• This is a classic outsourcing-of-responsibility defence: they acknowledge processing the transactions, but deny any duty to investigate legality or victim compensation beyond closing the user’s account.

3. Victim Blaming: The Permanent Account Closure

In a move described as a “security reason,” Skrill has permanently closed the victim’s account following his report of identity theft. While the merchants who allegedly facilitated the fraud remain “checked” and “satisfied” in Skrill’s eyes, the victim is de-platformed, cutting off his access to internal dispute tools.

4. The Impressive “KYC Check” Failure

Skrill maintains that these merchants “passed all relevant checks”. However, our research shows Cyperion Solutions Ltd is registered as a “Management Consultancy” in the UK. The fact that an e-money institution allows a “consultancy” to process thousands of transactions for unlicensed Curaçao casinos (Slotoro/Boomerang-Bet) suggests a catastrophic failure in Skrill’s Know Your Business (KYB) and Merchant Monitoring protocols.+1

Conclusion: The Regulatory Imperative

Skrill’s response proves that the Galaktika N.V. network is not operating in the shadows; it is operating through the front door of regulated European payment institutions. By providing the technical environment for transaction laundering while claiming zero liability, Skrill is effectively serving as the financial engine for the “Cloaked Casino Clan.”

The Shadow Skrill Setting

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This documentation definitively places Paygate at the center of the Galaktika/Wiraon financial engine. It acts as the technical “glue” that allows these diverse shell companies to interface with legitimate payment giants like Skrill without triggering immediate fraud alerts.

Whistleblower Call to Action: Are you a Skrill or Paysafe employee with knowledge of how Cyperion, Briantie, or Paygate bypassed merchant compliance? We need to know who approved these accounts. Contact us anonymously via Whistle42.